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RemembranceCommemoration of Casualties from the Parochial Parish of Kingsdown and Creekside.

 

News from the Home FrontReturn to Newspaper snippets from the Home Front

Unknown soldiers - photos of soldiers without known names.

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Artefacts ...

- Despatch covering the Battle of Jutland (31st May-1st June)

- Maps of the Front

 

Despatches from the Front ...

- 31st July 1916 - France & Flanders (JDP French account of period before he was replaced by D Haig)

- 19th May 1916 - France and Flanders (D Haig account of the lack of significant battles for British troops). The intense fighting for the French at Verdun is referenced.

- 24th June 1916 - North Sea (Sir John Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet). The Battle of Jutland.

- 4th July 1916 - German Commander-in-Chief, Scheer, report the Kaisser on The Battle of Jutland.

All Despatches transcribed by the Lynsted with Kingsdown Society

Imperial War Museum War Partnership logoFirst World War - Home Front News & Snippets.....
May 1916

World War 1 soldier at rest

As the Centenary unfolds, a range of newspaper and other records will appear here to give an idea of how the war was revealed at home primarily focused on Kent for our purposes .... fairly random. If you have other snippets to share, please let us know using the dedicated email account:
Parish Records Contact Address


Stabilised Front 1915 to end 1916The Western Front continued largely "stabilised" from January 1915 to the end of 1916. But assaults continued to take their toll on our local men; mostly on the Western Front. However, there were no military casualties for Kingsdown and Creekside Cluster between April and June (inclusive).

But May saw the German attack on Vimy Ridge on 21st May.

The most notable event for the British forces overseas was the Battle of Jutland [31st May to 1st June] that included the first British aerial co-operation with fleet in action. This was the first major battle in the North Sea. The losses of battleships and cruisers on both sides were: BRITISH: Indefatigable, Invincible, Queen Mary, Black Prince, Defence and Warrior; GERMAN: Pommern, Lutzow, Wiesbaden, Rostock, Frauenlob, and Elbing. We have added a Dover Express report below. We have transcribed the whole Official Despatch from Jellicoe for this action under "Artefacts" below. We have also transcribed (below) the German (Scheer) Commander-in-Chief's report on the German perspective that confirms their strategy in using U-boats and torpedoes together with larger guns.

At home, on 25th May, the Second Military Service Act became law in Great Britain, extending compulsion to married men. The first Faversham Tribunal under this new Act is recorded below.

Allied fighting continued away from the Western Front. In Western Persia, Qasr-i-Shirin was occupied by the Russians. The Serbian Government was set up at Salonika (7th May) and (9th May) Lieut.-General Sir George Milne succeeded Lieut.-General Sir Bryan Mahon as General Officer Commanding British Forces in Salonika. In Africa, the British began their advance from Northern Rhodesia into German East Africa on 25th May.

In Sudan, the Sultan of Darfur was defeated by Sudan forces in the affair of Beringiya (Darfur). El Fasher (capital of Darfur) was occupied on 23rd May.

In Ireland, on 1st May, the Easter Uprising leaders surrendered and on 3rd May three rebel leaders were executed.

Treaty events: The "Sykes-Picot" agreement between France and Britain was concluded (9th May) with the intention of post-war partition of Asia Minor. The British Government notified the Russian Government of their recognition of Franco-Russian "Sykes Picot" agreement on 23rd May.

An agreement was signed (10th May) in Berlin regarding employment of British and German prisoners of war and signed in London on 29th May. On 13th May, an Agreement was signed for wounded and sick prisoners of war to be moved to Switzerland.

Verdun Map showing forts (diamonds)The Battle of Verdun placed French Army resources under tremendous mortal strain - as did the German attackers.

Airship and aeroplane attacks continued with a raid (3rd May) on mid-Scotland by German airship "L.20" that was then wrecked at Stavanger (Norway). The following day, German airship "L.7" was destroyed off the Slesvig coast. On 5th May another airship (L.Z. 85) was brought down by British gunfire at Salonika. At this time, the airship destruction was reported under "naval" and "air" actions.

As part of the British aerial response, the first Air Board was formed to bring together all Army and Navy resources under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon. The first order of business was to knock the heads together of competing military decision-makers. Early meetings were not very well attended!

At sea, the first United States destroyer flotilla arrived at Queenstown on 2nd May following the American declaration of war on Germany on 6th April. on 17th May, The British Admiralty appointed a Committee to draw up plans for convoy of merchant ships in response to U-boat attacks. In the Mediterranean theatre, the British hospital ship "Dover Castle" was sunk by submarine on 26th May.

Statistics

The machinery for the detailed monthly compilation of Military Statistics did not take place until later in 1916 (October) after the intervention of Lloyd George (then Secretary of State for War). Statistics up until then were somewhat haphazardly recorded. However, the War Office bound together those War Statistics in March 1922 adding available data for earlier months.

May 1916 was the first month showing the strength of the Tank Corps, formerly Machine-Gun Corps (Heavy): May 1916 = 133 Officers and 1,069 Other Ranks. By the end of 1916, this force was expanded greatly throughout the remainder of the war. By the close of the War the figures showed (November 1918) 2,801 Officers and 25,498 Other Ranks.

The number of military aeroplanes in existence on 31st May 1916, was 713 abroad and 1,230 at home, whilst 25 machines were under test. By 29th September, this figure changed to 1,035 abroad, 1,677 at home, and 30 under test. On 31st May there were 15 contractors building aeroplanes of Government designs, 15 were building private designs, and three were building both; whilst on 29th September, 15 were building government designs, 19 private designs, and three were building both. On 31st May, 53 contractors were working direct on spares for aeroplanes, and 182 on miscellaneous work. In May, orders for 8,403 aeroplanes were in progress, of which 2,979 had been delivered. At the same time, 9,962 aeroplane engines were in progress, and of these 2,412 had been delivered. There were 22 stations at which squadrons were stationed either in huts or billets, or under canvas. In September there were 28 bases. The number of officers serving overseas was 1,161 and the number at home was 1,457. In September, 1,639 were serving overseas with 3,528 at home, and there were at home and abroad 42,482 other ranks.


Common Assault Dismissed, Affiliation Order granted

Reported in the South Eastern Gazette on 9th May 1916: "COUNTY PETTY SESSIONS. At these Sessions on Thursday [4th May] (Mr.W.W. Berry in the chair), a summons for assault, brought by Daisy Willis, of Teynham, against Emily Bordini, of Lynsted, was dismissed by the Bench, who thought it should not have been brought. The Chairman characterised it as a foolish case - a silly street squabble.

May Barratt, a single woman, of Conyer, Teynham, was granted an affiliation order against George Ashdown, also of Conyer, who was ordered to pay 2s. 6d. a week until the child is 14."


Exemption from Conscription sought by father and rejected

Reported by the Kent Messenger on 20th May 1916: A BAKER'S SON. The East Kent Appeal Tribunal at Canterbury on Saturday [13th May] refused the application for exemption made for George Frederick Gambell, 25, baker, Greenstreet, by his father, who said he was unable to work himself and the son was the only man left in his employ. [Survived: Born 24th January 1871; Joined the Navy 29th May 1916 serving - HMS Pembroke I/Chatham; "Undaunted"; Pembroke I/Chatham; "Wallington"; Pembroke I; Demobbed 26th July 1919].


Bishop of Croydon's Confirmation Service at Lynsted

Reported in the South Eastern Gazette on 23rd July 1916: At a confirmation held on May 13th at Lynsted, by the Bishop of Croydon, 71 candidates were presented, this, it is believed, being the largest number ever confirmed at Lynsted at one service. The candidates ranged in age from 68 to 12, with an average of 20, and 57 of them belonged to Lynsted.


Vicar of Tonge Prosecuted and exonerated for running man over

Reported in the Kent Messenger on 20th May 1916: DAMAGES AGAINST A VICAR. Damages of £175 were cast in the King's Bench Division, on Wednesday [17th May], against the Rev. J.M. Apperly, of the Vicarage, Tonge, who was defendant in an action brought by Mr. Frank Hawkins, tailor, of Sittingbourne. The plaintiff, in March, 1914, on alighting from a motor bus at Greenstreet, was knocked down and run over by defendant's motor car, sustaining injuries to his head, ribs, and hands, the result of which had, he said, at the age of 64, impaired his earning capacity. Defendant denied negligence, but admitted a previous accident in which a child, who ran into his car, was killed. The Coroner's jury, however, exonerated him from blame.- Judgment was given as stated.


Anti-suffrage sentiment - 'war work is not an argument for suffrage ....'

22nd May 1916 - The Times Letter Page gives vent to those opposing any argument that women's work during the war might lead to womens' suffrage after the war. Read this letter and others found on our "Womens' War Work" page. This argument persisted throughout the war amongst certain groups and individuals.


Military Service Tribunal sitting after 2nd Military Service Act - married men conscription

The Dover Express reported on 26th May 1916: FAVERSHAM TRIBUNAL AND SMALL TRADESMEN. The "Kentish Observer" (Canterbury) contains the following this week:-"Well done, Faversham! At the sitting of the local Military Service Tribunal on Monday [22nd May] in that borough conditional exemption was granted to all the small tradesmen, the Mayor (Dr. S.R. Alexander) remarking. "I cannot think that it is intended that we should smash up all these small businesses." His Worship is quite right; it was clearly and emphatically stated by Mr. Long in the House of Commons last week that there was no intention of doing anything of the sort, and that a circular would be forthwith sent to the tribunals advising them to grant exemption to the heads of business undertaking. Unfortunately, many of the tribunals are not acting upon this hint. We congratulate the Faversham Tribunal on its prompt response to the Government's recommendation, and trust that other tribunals will follow its splendid example. It is only fair to say that the Canterbury Tribunal is dealing very considerately with the married men, especially those at the head of business concerns; the members evidently appreciate the importance of retaining men to carry on the trade of the country, without which the sinews of war would suffer."


The Battle of Jutland - first naval battle in the North Sea - 31st May to 1st June

Reported in the Dover Express on 9th June 1916: NAVAL BATTLE IN THE NORTH SEA.- GERMAN FLEET DRIVEN INTO PORT. - The first general Naval engagement to take place in the North Sea during the present War occurred last Wednesday week [31st May], when the British Fleet encountered the German Fleet off the west coast of Denmark. The action commenced about 5 o'clock, there being a misty air. The battle cruisers, under Admiral Beatty, first came into action with the German battle cruisers, who were shortly afterwards supported by the German Battle Fleet. The British Battle Fleet did not arrive till nearly seven o'clock and the meantime the British battle cruisers supported by fair battleships of the "Queen Elizabeth" class, and the First Cruiser Squadron, kept the whole German Fleet engaged. During this engagement the "Queen Mary," the "Invincible," which was the flagship of Rear-Admiral Hood, who during the earlier part of the War was the Admiral at Dover, commanding the Dover Patrol, and whose Flag Captain was Captain A.L. Cay, son of Captain R.B. Cay, R.N., of Godwyne Road, Dover, the "Indefatigable," the "Black Prince," the "Defence," and the "Warrior," were sunk, and, with few exceptions, the whole of the crews were lost. (The crew of the "Warrior" were nearly all saved.) During this part of the engagement the Germans, it is believed, lost two of their latest battle cruisers and several light cruisers. The Battle Fleet arriving, the tables were turned on the German Fleet, who, after a very few moments, turned tail and ran for their ports. The British torpedo flotilla during the night attacked the German Fleet during their retirement. The exact happenings during this is not known, but at least one German Battleship was torpedoed and sunk by the German's own account. I the end the German Fleet were driven back ingloriously into their own ports, having declined to fight the general engagement, and the object of their outcoming - not yet announced was utterly defeated.


ARTEFACTS - Background Records...................


Battle of Jutland (31st May/1st June) - Official Despatch made on 24th June 1916

Reported in the the Third Supplement to The London Gazette of Tuesday, the 4th of July, 1916. Number 29654 (page 6713). Submitted by the Admiralty on 6th July 1916, covering Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet, reporting the action in the North Sea on 31st May, 1916
"Iron Duke," - dated 24th June, 1916.

*All times given in this report are Greenwich mean time.

SIR,—Be pleased to inform the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty that the German High Sea Fleet was brought to action on 31st May, 1916, to the westward of the Jutland Bank, off the coast of Denmark.
The ships of the Grand Fleet, in pursuance of the general policy of periodical sweeps through the North Sea, had left its bases on the previous day, in accordance with instructions issued by me.

In the early afternoon of Wednesday, 31 May, the 1st and 2nd Battle-cruiser Squadrons, 1st, 2nd and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons and destroyers from the 1st, 9th, 10th and 13th Flotillas, supported by the 5th Battle Squadron, were, in accordance with my directions, scouting to the southward of the Battle Fleet, which was accompanied by the 3rd Battle-cruiser Squadron, 1st and 2nd Cruiser Squadrons, 4th Light-cruiser Squadron, 4th, 11th and 12th Flotillas.

The junction of the Battle Fleet .with the scouting force after the enemy had been sighted was delayed owing to the southerly course steered by our advanced force during the first hour after commencing their action with the enemy battle-cruisers. This was, of course, unavoidable, as had our battle-cruisers not followed the enemy to the southward the main fleets would never have been in contact.

The Battle-cruiser Fleet, gallantly led by Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty, K.C.B., M.VO., D.S.O., and admirably supported by the ships of the Fifth Battle Squadron under Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; M. V.O., fought an action under, at times, disadvantageous conditions, especially in regard to light, in a manner that was in keeping with the best traditions of the service.

The following extracts from the (personally revised) report of Sir David Beatty give the course of events before the Battle Fleet came upon the scene :-

A revisionist view of these charts suggest that Beatty altered the "official" charts to give an impression that he was in contact with the Germans at all times - this appears to be have been a self-serving tampering with the truth to raise his stock and damage Jellicoe.

jutland opening actions"At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from 'Galatea.' (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.,) indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base.

"At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the north-ward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle-cruisers.

"After the first report of the enemy, the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned to E.S.E., the course an which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was excellent, and of great value.
"From a report from 'Galatea' at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered 'Engadine' (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in 'Engadine' about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the sea-plane had to fly at a height of 900 feet within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear.
This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.

"At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots, and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E. slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000 yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.

"At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E. the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.

"At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The destroyer 'Landrail' (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart), of 9th Flotilla, who was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of 'Lydiard' (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and 'Landrail' undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. 'Nottingham' (Captain Charles B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam.

"Eight destroyers of the 13th Flotilla, 'Nestor' (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), 'Nomad' (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), 'Nicator' (Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), 'Narborough' (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), 'Pelican' (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), 'Petard' (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C.O. Thomson), 'Obdurate' (Lieutenant-Commander Cecil H. H. Sams), 'Nerissa ' (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with 'Moorsom' (Commander John C. Hodgson), and 'Morris' (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of 10th Flotilla, 'Turbulent' (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), and 'Termagant' (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m., simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy Destroyers. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner, and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes, they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light-cruiser and fifteen destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk, and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective, owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.

'Nestor,’ 'Nomad' and 'Nicator,' gallantly led by Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham, of 'Nestor,' pressed home their attack on the battle-cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament.

'Nomad' was badly hit, and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently 'Nestor' and 'Nicator' altered course to the S.E., and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack fired a torpedo at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo, 'Nestor' was badly hit and swung to starboard, 'Nicator' altering course inside her to avoid collision, and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo.

'Nicator' made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain (D), 13th Flotilla. 'Nestor' remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. 'Moorsom' also carried out an attack on the enemy's battle fleet.

'Petard,’ 'Nerissa," 'Turbulent’ and 'Termagant' also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers.

Petard' reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while 'Nerissa' states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other Officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.

"From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy. depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.

"At 4.38 p m. 'Southampton' (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.VO., A.D.C.) re-ported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued.

'Southampton,' with the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. 'Southampton's' reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas, in 'Barham' (Captain Arthur W. Craig), this squadron supported us brilliantly and effectively.

"At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet.

'Fearless' (Captain (D) Charles D. Roper), with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers, and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. 'Champion' (Captain (D) James U. Faris), with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light-cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light-cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.

"The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the -range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by Princess Royal' (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S.O.) and 'Tiger' (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. 'Onslow' (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey) and 'Moresby' (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist 'Engadine' with the seaplane, rejoined the battle-cruiser squadrons and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of 'Lion' (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, CVO.). At 5.10 p.m. 'Moresby,' being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship in the line.

'Moresby' then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke, and rejoined 'Champion.' In corroboration of this, 'Fearless' reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m., and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.

"At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E., and the estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light-cruisers which had sighted and were engaged with the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.
"Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battle-ships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the 'Koenig' class.

"At about 6.5 p.m. 'Onslow’ being on the engaged bow of 'Lion,' sighted an enemy light-cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. 'Onslow' at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits.

'Onslow' then closed the enemy battle-cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the Commanding Officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed with the light-cruiser previously engaged and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused 'Onslow' to stop.

"At 7.15 p.m. 'Defender' (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots, while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers, by a shell which damaged her foremost boiler, closed 'Onslow' and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished.

During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when Onslow ' was transferred to tugs.

I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieutenant-Commander J. C. Tovey, of 'Onslow,' and Lieutenant-Commander L. R. Palmer, of 'Defender,' for special recognition. 'Onslow' was possibly the destroyer referred to by the Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as follows. Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again, and made straight for the 'Derfflinger' to attack her."

Proceedings of Battle Fleet and Third Battle Cruiser Squadron.

jutland main battleOn receipt of the information that the enemy had been sighted, the British Battle Fleet, with its accompanying cruiser and destroyer force, proceeded at full speed on a S.E. by S. course to close the Battle-cruiser Fleet. During the two hours that elapsed before the arrival of the Battle Fleet on the scene the steaming qualities of the older battleships were severely tested.. Great credit is due to the engine-room departments for the manner in which they, as always, responded to the call, the whole Fleet maintaining a speed in excess of the trial speeds of some of the older vessels.

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, commanded by - Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., which was in advance of the Battle Fleet, was ordered to reinforce Sir David Beatty. At 5.30 p.m. this squadron observed flashes of gunfire and heard the sound of guns to-the south-westward. Rear-Admiral. Hood sent the Chester' (Captain Robert N. Lawson) to investigate, and this ship engaged three or four enemy light-cruisers at about 5.45 p.m. The engagement lasted for about twenty minutes, during which period Captain Lawson handled his vessel with great skill against heavy odds, and, although the ship suffered considerably in casualties, her fighting and steaming qualities were unimpaired, and at about 6.5 p.m. she rejoined the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron.

The Third Battle-cruiser Squadron had turned to the north-westward, and at 6.10 p.m. sighted our battle-cruisers, the squadron taking station ahead of the Lion ' at 6.21 p.m. in accordance with the orders of the Vice-Admiral Commanding Battle-cruiser Fleet. He reports as follows :—

"I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the westward of south. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy battle-fleet.

"By 6.50 p.m. the battle-cruisers were clear of our leading battle squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles, and I ordered the Third Battle-cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the report of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle-cruisers. Before leaving us the Fifth Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.

"From the report of Rear-Admiral T.D.W. Napier, M.V.O., the Third Light-cruiser-Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy„ at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo.

'Falmouth' (Captain John D. Edwards) and 'Yarmouth' (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The Third Light-cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. 'Indomitable' (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the 'Derfflinger' class fell out of the enemy's line."

Meanwhile, at 5.45 p.m., the report of guns had become audible to me, and at 5.55 p.m. flashes were visible from ahead round to the starboard beam, although in the mist no ships could be distinguished, and the position of the enemy's battle fleet could not be determined. The difference in estimated position by reckoning between ' Iron Duke' (Captain Frederic C. Dreyer, C.B.) and Lion, which was inevitable under the circumstances, added to the uncertainty of the general situation.

Shortly after 5.55 p.m. some of the cruisers ahead, under Rear-Admirals Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., and Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bt., M.V.O., were seen to be in action, and reports received show that 'Defence,' flagship (Captain Stanley V: Ellis), and Warrior (Captain Vincent B. Molten), of the First Cruiser Squadron, engaged an enemy light-cruiser at this time. She was subsequently observed to sink.

At 6 p.m. Canterbury ' (Captain Percy M.R. Royds), which ship was in company with the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, had engaged enemy light-cruisers which were firing heavily on the torpedo-boat destroyer 'Shark’ (Commander Loftus W. Jones), 'Acasta’ (Lieutenant-Commander John O. Barron), and 'Christopher' (Lieutenant-Commander Fair fax M. Kerr); as a result of this engagement the 'Shark' was sunk.

At 6 p.m. vessels, afterwards seen to be our battle-cruisers, were sighted by 'Marlborough' bearing before the starboard beam of the battle fleet.

At the same time the Vice-Admiral Commanding, Battle-cruiser Fleet, reported to me the position of the enemy battle-cruisers, and at 6.14 p.m. reported the position of the enemy battle fleet.

At this period, when the battle fleet was meeting the battle-cruisers and the Fifth Battle Squadron, great care was necessary to ensure that our own ships were not mistaken for enemy vessels.

I formed the Battle Fleet in line of battle on receipt of Sir David Beatty's report, and during deployment the fleets became engaged. Sir David Beatty had meanwhile formed the battle-cruisers ahead of the battle fleet.

The divisions of the battle fleet were led by :-
The Commander-in-Chief.
Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, K.C.B
Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Bt., K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G.
Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, C.B. Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson, C.B. Rear-Admiral Ernest F. A. Gaunt, C.M.G.

At 6.16 p.m. 'Defence' and 'Warrior' were observed passing down between the British and, German Rattle Fleets under a very heavy fire. 'Defence' disappeared, and 'Warrior' passed to the rear disabled.

It is probable that Sir Robert Arbuthnot, during his engagement with the enemy's light-cruisers and in his desire to complete their destruction, was not aware of the approach of the enemy's heavy ships, owing to the mist, until he found himself in close proximity to the main fleet, and before he could withdraw his ships they were caught under a heavy fire and disabled. It is not known when 'Black Prince' (Captain Thomas P. Bonham), of the same squadron, was sunk, but a wireless signal was received from her between 8 and 9 p.m.
The First Battle Squadron became engaged during deployment, the Vice-Admiral opening ire at 6.17 p.m. on a battleship of the 'Kaiser' class. The other Battle Squadrons, which had previously been firing at an enemy light-cruiser, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on battleships of the 'Koenig' class.

At 6.6 p.m. the Rear-Admiral Commanding Fifth Battle Squadron, then in company with the battle-cruisers, had sighted the starboard wing division of the battle-fleet on the port bow of 'Barham,' and the first intention of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas was to form ahead of the remainder of the battle-fleet, but on realising the direction of deployment he was compelled to form astern, a manoeuvre which was well executed by the squadron under a heavy fire from the enemy battle-fleet. An accident to 'Warspite's' steering gear caused her helm to become jammed temporarily and took the ship in the direction of the enemy's line, during which time she was hit several times. Clever handling enabled Captain Edward M. Phillpotts to extricate his ship from a somewhat awkward situation.

Owing principally to the mist, but partly to the smoke, it was possible to see only a few ships at a time in the enemy's battle line. Towards the van only some four or five ships were ever visible at once. More could be seen from the rear squadron, but never more than eight to twelve.

The action between the battle-fleets lasted intermittently from 6.17 p.m. to 8.20 p.m. at ranges between 9,000 and 12,000 yards, during which time the British Fleet made alterations of course from S.E. by E. to W. in the endeavour to close. The enemy constantly turned away and opened the range under cover of destroyer attacks and smoke screens as the effect of the British fire was felt, and the alterations of course had the effect of bringing the British Fleet (which commenced the action in a position of advantage on the bow of the enemy) to a quarterly bearing from the enemy battle line, but at the same time placed us between the enemy and his bases.
At 6.55 p.m. 'Iron Duke' passed the wreck of 'Invincible' (Captain Arthur L. Cay), with 'Badger' (Commander C. A. Fremantle) standing by.

During the somewhat brief periods that the ships of the High Sea Fleet were visible through the mist, the heavy and effective fire kept up by the battleships and battle-cruisers of the Grand Fleet caused me much satisfaction, and the enemy vessels were seen to be constantly hit, some being observed to haul out of the line and at least one to sink. The enemy's return fire at this period was not effective, and the damage caused to our ships was insignificant.

The Battle-cruisers in the Van.

Sir David Beatty reports:-
"At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was south. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the south-westward.
"Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the 'Koenig' class. No doubt more continued the line to the northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and in-creased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again, after a very short time, the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.

"At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the First and Third Light-cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to west in support. We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by Lion,' and turned away eight points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. 'Princess Royal’ set fire to a three-funnelled battleship. 'New Zealand' (Captain John F. E. Green) and 'Indomitable’ report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line, heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and Falmouth ' reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to the westward.

"At 8.40 p.m. all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.
"I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m. Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the north-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. 'Minotaur' (Captain Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing north 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading battle squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing N.N.E. I kept you informed of my position, course, and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.

"In view of the gathering darkness, and the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so."

Details of Battle-fleet Action.

As was anticipated, the German Fleet appeared to rely very much on torpedo attacks, which were favoured by the low visibility and by the fact that we had arrived in the position of a "following" or "chasing" fleet. A large number of torpedoes were apparently fired, but only one took effect (on 'Marlborough'), and even in this case the ship was able to remain in the line and to continue the action. The enemy's efforts to keep out of effective gun range were aided by the weather conditions, which were ideal for the purpose. Two separate destroyer attacks were made by the enemy.

The First Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney, came into action at 6.17 p.m. with the enemy's Third Battle Squadron, at a range of about 11,000 yards, and administered severe punishment, both to the battleships and to the battle-cruisers and light-cruisers, which were also engaged. The fire of 'Marlborough' (Captain George P. Ross) was particularly rapid and effective. This ship commenced at 6.17 p.m. by firing seven salvoes at a ship of the Kaiser ' class, then engaged a cruiser, and again a battleship, and at 6.54 she was hit by a torpedo and took up a considerable list to starboard, but reopened at 7.3 p.m. at a cruiser and at 7.12 p.m. fired fourteen rapid salvoes at a ship of the 'Koenig' class, hitting her frequently until she turned out of the line. The manner in which this effective fire was kept up in spite of the disadvantages due to the injury caused by the torpedo was most creditable to the ship and a very fine example to the squadron.

The range decreased during the course of the action to 9,000 yards. The First Battle Squadron received more of the enemy's return fire than the remainder of the battle-fleet, with the exception of the Fifth Battle Squadron. 'Colossus' (Captain Alfred D. P. R. Pound) was hit but was not seriously damaged, and other ships were straddled with fair frequency.

In the Fourth Battle Squadron - in which squadron my flagship 'Iron Duke' was placed - Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee leading one of the divisions - the enemy engaged was the squadron consisting of 'Koenig' and 'Kaiser' class and some of the battle-cruisers, as well as disabled cruisers and light-cruisers. The mist rendered range-taking a difficult matter, but the fire of the squadron was effective. 'Iron Duke,' having previously fired at a light-cruiser between the lines, opened fire at 6.30 p.m. on a battleship of the Koenig' class at a range of 12,000 yards. The latter was very quickly straddled, and hitting commenced at the second salvo and only ceased when the target ship turned away.
The rapidity with which hitting was established was most creditable to the excellent gunnery organisation of the flagship, so ably commanded by my Flag Captain, Captain Frederic C. Dreyer.
The fire of other ships of the squadron was principally directed at enemy battle-cruisers and cruisers as they appeared out of the mist. Hits were observed to take effect on several ships.
The ships of the Second Battle Squadron, under Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, were in action with vessels of the 'Kaiser' or 'Koenig' classes between 6.30 and 7.20 p.m., and fired also at an enemy battle-cruiser which had dropped back apparently severely damaged.
During the action between the battle fleets the Second Cruiser Squadron, ably commanded by Rear-Admiral Herbert L. Heath, M.V.O., with the addition of 'Duke of Edinburgh' (Captain Henry Blackett) of the First Cruiser Squadron, occupied a position at the van, and acted as a connecting link between the battle fleet and the battle-cruiser fleet. This squadron, although it carried out useful work, did not have an opportunity of coming into action.
The attached cruisers 'Boadicea' (Captain Louis C. S. Woollcombe, M.V.O.), 'Active' (Captain Percy Withers), 'Blanche' (Captain John M. Casement.), and 'Bellona' (Captain Arthur B. S. Dutton) carried out their duties as repeating-ships with remarkable rapidity and accuracy under difficult conditions.
The Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron, under Commodore Charles E. Le Mesurier, occupied a position in the van until ordered to attack enemy destroyers at 7.20 p.m., and again at 8.18 p.m., when they supported the Eleventh Flotilla, which had moved out under Commodore James R. P. Hawksley, M.V.O., to attack. On each occasion the Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron was very well handled by Commodore Le Mesurier, his captains giving him excellent support, and their object was attained, although with some loss in the second attack, when the ships came under the heavy fire of the enemy battle fleet at between 6,500 and 8,000 yards. The 'Calliope' (Commodore Le Mesurier) was hit several times, but did not sustain serious damage, although, I regret to say, she had several casualties. The light-cruisers attacked the enemy's battleships with torpedoes at this time, and an explosion on board a ship of the 'Kaiser' class was seen at 8.40 p.m.
During these destroyer attacks four enemy torpedo-boat destroyers were sunk by the gunfire of battleships, light-cruisers and destroyers. After the arrival of the British Battle Fleet the enemy's tactics were of a nature generally to avoid further action, in which they were favoured by the conditions of visibility.

Night Dispositions.

At 9 p.m. the enemy was entirely out of sight, and the threat of torpedo boat-destroyer attacks during the rapidly approaching darkness made it necessary for me to dispose the fleet for the night, with a view to its safety from such attacks, whilst providing for a renewal of action at daylight. I accordingly manoeuvred to remain between the enemy and his bases, placing our flotillas in a position in which they would afford protection to the fleet from destroyer attack, and at the same time be favourably situated for attacking the enemy's heavy ships.

Night Attacks by Flotillas.

During the night the British heavy ships were not attacked, but the Fourth, Eleventh and Twelfth Flotillas, under Commodore Hawkesley and Captains Charles J. Wintour and Anselan J. B. Stirling, delivered a series of very gallant and successful attacks on the enemy, causing him heavy losses.
It was during these attacks that severe losses in the Fourth Flotilla occurred, including that of 'Tipperary,' with the gallant leader of the Flotilla, Captain Wintour. He had brought his flotilla to a high pitch of perfection, and although suffering severely from the fire of the enemy, a heavy toll of enemy vessels was taken, and many gallant actions were performed by the flotilla.
Two torpedoes were seen to take effect on enemy vessels as the result of the attacks of the Fourth Flotilla, one being from 'Spitfire' (Lieutenant-Commander Clarence W. E. Trelawny), and the other from either 'Ardent' (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), 'Ambuscade' (Lieutenant-Commander Gordon A. Coles) or 'Garland' (Lieutenant-Commander Reginald S. Goff).
The attack carried out by the Twelfth Flotilla (Captain Anselan J. B. Stirling) was admirably executed. The squadron attacked, which consisted of six large vessels, besides light-cruisers, and comprised vessels of the 'Kaiser' class, was taken by surprise. A large number of torpedoes was fired, including some at the second and third ships in the line; those fired at the third ship took effect, and she was observed to blow up. A second attack made twenty minutes later by 'Maenad' (Commander John P. Champion) on the five vessels still remaining, resulted in the fourth ship in the line being also hit.
The destroyers were under a heavy fire from the light-cruisers on reaching the rear of the line, but the 'Onslaught' (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur G. Onslow, D.S.C.) was the only vessel which received any material injuries. In the 'Onslaught' Sub-Lieutenant Harry W. A. Kemmis, assisted by Midshipman Reginald G. Arnot, R.N.R., the only executive officers not disabled, brought the ship successfully out of action and reached her home port.
During the attack carried out by the Eleventh Flotilla, 'Castor' (Commodore James R. P. Hawksley) leading the flotilla, engaged and sank an enemy torpedo-boat destroyer at point-blank range.

Sir David Beatty reports:-

"The Thirteenth Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Farie, in 'Champion,' took station astern of the battle fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to 'Petard' and 'Turbulent,' switched on searchlights and opened a heavy fire, which disabled 'Turbulent.' At 3.30 a.m. 'Champion' was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. 'Moresby' reports four ships of 'Deutschland' class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by 'Moresby' and 'Obdurate'.
'Fearless' and the 1st Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 31st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, 'Fearless ' was unable to follow the battle cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line. She sighted during the night a battleship of the 'Kaiser' class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after."
There were many gallant deeds performed by the destroyer flotillas; they surpassed the very highest expectations that I had formed of them.
Apart from the proceedings of the flotillas, the Second Light-cruiser Squadron in the rear of the battle fleet was in close action for about 15 minutes at 10.20 p.m. with a squadron comprising one enemy cruiser and four light-cruisers, during which period Southampton' and Dublin ' (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffered rather heavy casualties, although their steaming and fighting qualities were not impaired. The return fire of the squadron appeared to be very effective.
'Abdiel,' ably commanded by Commander Berwick Curtis, carried out her duties with the success which has always characterised her work.

Proceedings on 1st June.

At daylight, 1st June, the battle fleet, being then to the southward and westward of the Horn Reef, turned to the northward in search of enemy vessels and for the purpose of collecting our own cruisers and torpedo-boat destroyers. At 2.30 a.m. Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney transferred his flag from 'Marlborough' to 'Revenge,' as the former ship had some difficulty in keeping up the speed of the squadron. 'Marlborough' was detached by my direction to a base, successfully driving off an enemy submarine attack en route. The visibility early on 1st June (three to four miles) was less than on 31st May, and the torpedo-boat destroyers, being out of visual touch, did not rejoin until 9 a.m. The British Fleet remained in the proximity of the battlefield and near the line of approach to German ports until 11 a.m. on 1st June, in spite of the disadvantage of long distances from fleet bases and the danger incurred in waters adjacent to enemy coasts from submarines and torpedo craft. The enemy, however, made no sign, and I was reluctantly compelled to the conclusion that the High Sea Fleet had returned into port. Subsequent events proved this assumption to have been correct. Our position must have been known to the enemy, as at 4 a.m. the Fleet engaged a Zeppelin for about five minutes, during which time she had ample opportunity to note and subsequently report the position and course of the British Fleet.
The waters from the latitude of the Horn Reef to the scene of the action were thoroughly searched, and some survivors from the destroyers 'Ardent' (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur Marsden), 'Fortune' (Lieutenant Commander Frank G. Terry), and 'Tipperary' (Captain (D) Charles J. Wintour), were picked up, and the 'Sparrowhawk' (Lieutenant-Commander Sydney Hopkins), which had been in collision and was no longer seaworthy, was sunk after her crew had been taken off. A large amount of wreckage was seen, but no enemy ships, and at 1.15 p.m., it being evident that the German Fleet had succeeded in returning to port, course was shaped for our bases, which were reached without further incident on Friday, 2nd June. A cruiser squadron was detached to search for 'Warrior,' which vessel had been abandoned whilst in tow of 'Engadine' on her way to the base owing to bad weather setting in and the vessel becoming unseaworthy, but no trace of her was discovered, and a further subsequent search by a light-cruiser squadron having failed to locate her, it is evident that she foundered.

Sir David Beatty reports in regard to the 'Engadine' as follows:—
"The work of 'Engadine' appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed 'Warrior' for 75 miles between 8.40 p.m., 31st May, and 7.15 a.m., 1st June, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's company."
I fully endorse his remarks.
The Fleet fuelled and replenished with ammunition, and at 9.30 p.m. on 2nd June was reported ready for further action.

Losses.

The conditions of low visibility under which the day action took place and the approach of darkness enhance the difficulty of giving an accurate report of the damage inflicted or the names of the ships sunk by our forces, but after a most careful examination of the evidence of all officers, who testified to seeing enemy vessels actually sink, and personal interviews with a large number of these officers, I am of opinion that the list shown in the enclosure gives the minimum in regard to numbers, though it is possibly not entirely accurate as regards the particular class of vessel, especially those which were sunk during the night attacks. In addition to the vessels sunk, it, is unquestionable that many other ships were very seriously damaged by gunfire and by torpedo attack.
I deeply regret to report the loss of H.M. ships Queen Mary, 'Indefatigable,' 'Invincible,' 'Defence,' 'Black Prince,' 'Warrior,' and of H.M. T.B.D .'s 'Tipperary,' 'Ardent,' 'Fortune,' 'Shark,'Sparrowhawk, 'Nestor, 'Nomad,' and 'Turbulent,' and still more do I regret the resultant heavy loss of life. The death of such gallant and distinguished officers as Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, Bart., Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood, Captain Charles F. Sowerby, Captain Cecil I. Prowse, Captain Arthur L. Cay, Captain Thomas P. Bonham, Captain Charles J. Wintour, and Captain Stanley V. Ellis, and those who perished with them, is a serious loss to the Navy and to the country. They led officers and men who were equally gallant, and whose death is mourned by their comrades in the Grand Fleet. They fell doing their duty nobly, a death which they would have been the first to desire.
The enemy fought with the gallantry that was expected of him. We particularly admired the conduct of those on board a disabled German light-cruiser which passed down the British line shortly after deployment, under a heavy fire, which was returned by the only gun left in action.

The Personnel of the Fleet.

The conduct of officers and men throughout the day and night actions was entirely beyond praise. No words of mine could do them justice. On all sides it is reported to me that the glorious traditions of the past were most worthily upheld - whether in heavy ships, cruisers, light-cruisers, or destroyers the same admirable spirit prevailed. Officers and men were cool and determined, with a cheeriness that would have carried them through anything. The heroism of the wounded was the admiration of all.
I cannot adequately express the pride with which the spirit of the Fleet filled me.
Details of the work of the various ships during action have now been given. It must never be forgotten, however, that the prelude to action is the work of the engine-room department, and that during action the officers and men of that department perform their most important duties without the incentive which a knowledge of the course of the action gives to those on deck. The qualities of discipline and endurance are taxed to the utmost under these conditions, and, they were, as always, most fully maintained throughout the operations under review. Several ships attained speeds that had never before been reached, thus showing very clearly their high state of steaming efficiency. Failures in material were conspicuous by their absence, and several in-stances are reported of magnificent work on the part of the engine-room departments of injured ships.
The artisan ratings also carried out much valuable work during and after the action; they could not have done better.
The work of the medical officers of the .Fleet, carried out very largely under the most difficult conditions, was entirely admirable and invaluable. Lacking in many cases all the essentials for performing critical operations, and with their staff seriously depleted by casualties, they worked untiringly and with the greatest success. To them we owe a deep debt of gratitude.
It will be seen that the hardest fighting fell to the lot of the Battle-cruiser Fleet (the units of which were less heavily armoured than their opponents), the Fifth Battle Squadron, the First Cruiser Squadron, Fourth Light-cruiser Squadron and the Flotillas. This was inevitable under the conditions, and the squadrons and flotillas mentioned as well as the individual vessels composing them were handled with conspicuous ability, as were also the 1st, 2nd and 4th Squadrons of the Battle Fleet and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron.
I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the manner in which all the vessels were handled. The conditions were such as to call for great skill and ability, quick judgment and decisions, and this was conspicuous throughout the day.
I beg also to draw special attention to the services rendered by Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney (Second in Command of the Grand Fleet), Vice-Admiral Sir Thomas Jerram, Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee, Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas, Rear-Admiral Alexander L. Duff, Rear-Admiral Arthur C. Leveson and Rear-Admiral. Ernest F. A. Gaunt, commanding squadrons or divisions in the Battle Fleet. They acted throughout with skill and judgment. Sir Cecil Burney's squadron owing to its position was able to see more of the enemy Battle Fleet than the other battle squadrons, and under a leader who has rendered me most valuable and loyal assistance at all times the squadron did excellent work. The magnificent squadron commanded by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas formed a support of great value to Sir David Beatty during the afternoon, and was brought into action in rear of the Battle Fleet in the most judicious manner in the evening.
Sir David Beatty once again showed his fine qualities of gallant leadership, firm determination and correct strategic insight. He appreciated the situations at once on sighting first the enemy's lighter forces, then his battle-cruisers and finally his battle fleet. I can fully sympathise with his feelings when the evening mist and fading light robbed the Fleet of that complete victory for which he had manoeuvred, and for which the vessels in company with him had striven so hard. The services rendered by him, not only on this, but on two previous occasions, have been of the very greatest value.
Sir David Beatty brings to my notice the brilliant support afforded him by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas; the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral The Hon. Horace Hood brought his squadron into action, the able support afforded him by Rear-Admiral William C. Pakenham and Rear-Admiral Osmond de B. Brock, and the good work performed by the Light-cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral Trevylyan D. W. Napier, Commodore William E Goodenough and Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair. He states that on every occasion these officers anticipated his wishes and used their forces to the best possible effect.

I most fully endorse all his remarks, and I forward also the following extract from his report regarding the valuable services rendered by his staff :-
"I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain Rudolf W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag-Commander, the Hon. Reginald A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture; my Secretary, Frank T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant-Commander Ralph E. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances despite the fact that Ns signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manoeuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire."
I cannot close this despatch without recording the brilliant work of my Chief of the Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Charles Madden, K.C.B., C.V.O. Throughout a period of 21 months of war his services have been of inestimable value. His good judgment, his long experience in fleets, special gift for organisation, and his capacity for unlimited work, have all been of the greatest assistance to me, and have relieved me of much of the anxiety inseparable from the conduct of the Fleet during the war. In the stages leading up to the Fleet Action and during and after the action he was always at hand to assist, and his judgment never at fault. I owe him more than I can say.
My special thanks are due also to Commodore Lionel Halsey, C.M.G., the Captain of the Fleet, who also assists me in the working of the fleet at sea, and to whose good organisation is largely due the rapidity with which the fleet was fuelled and replenished with ammunition on return to its bases. He was of much assistance to me during the action.
Commander Charles M. Forbes, my flag-commander, and Commander Roger M. Bellairs, of my Staff, plotted the movements of the two fleets with rapidity and accuracy as reports were received; Commander the Hon. Matthew R. Best, M.V.O., of my Start acted as observer aloft throughout the action, and his services were of value. These officers carried out their duties with much efficiency during the action.
The signals were worked with smoothness and rapidity by Commander Alexander R. W. Woods, assisted by the other signal officers, and all ships responded remarkably well under difficult conditions. The signal departments in all ships deserve great credit for their work. My Flag-Lieutenant, Lieutenant-Commander Herbert, Fitzherbert, was also of much service to me throughout the action.
The high state of efficiency of the W/T arrangements of the fleet, and the facility with which they were worked before, during and after the action, is a great testimony to the indefatigable work carried out by Commander Richard L. Nicholson. His services have been invaluable throughout the war.
A special word of praise is due to the wireless departments in all ships.
My Secretaries, Fleet Paymasters Hamnet H. Share, C.B., and Victor H. T. Weekes, re-corded with accuracy salient features of the action. Their records have been of much assistance.
To the Master of the Fleet, Captain Oliver E. Leggett, I am indebted for the accuracy with which he kept the reckoning throughout the operations.
In a separate despatch I propose to bring to the notice of their Lordships the names of officers and men all of whom did not come under my personal observation, but who had the opportunity of specially distinguishing themselves.
I append the full text of Sir David Beatty's report to me, from which, as will be seen, I have made copious extracts in order to make my narrative continuous and complete.*
I am, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
J. R. JELLICOE, Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

[ENCLOSURE.]
List of Enemy Vessels put out of action, 31 May-1 June, 1916.

Battleships or Battle-cruisers.
2 Battleships, "Dreadnought" type.
1 Battleship, "Deutschland" type.
(Seen to sink.)
1 Battle-cruiser.
(Sunk—'Lutzow' admitted by Germans.)
1 Battleship, 'Dreadnought’ type.
1 Battle-cruiser.
(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

Light-cruisers.
5 Light-cruisers.
(Seen to sink; one of them had the appearance of being a larger type, and might have been a battleship.)

Torpedo-boat Destroyers,
6 Torpedo-boat Destroyers.
(Seen to sink.)
3 Torpedo-boat Destroyers.
(Seen to be so severely damaged as to render it extremely doubtful if they could reach port.)

Submarines.
1 Submarine. (Sunk.)
-----------------

APPENDIX

* NOTE.—The list of ships and commanding officers which took part in the action has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with practice.

" Lion,"
19th June, 1916.
Sir, -I have the honour to report that at 2.37 p.m. on 31st May, 1916, I was cruising and steering to the northward to join your Flag.

The Light Cruiser Screen was disposed from E. to W.
At 2.20 p.m. reports were received from 'Galatea' (Commodore Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., A.D.C.) indicating the presence of enemy vessels. The direction of advance was immediately altered to S.S.E., the course for Horn Reef, so as to place my force between the enemy and his base. At 2.35 p.m. a considerable amount of smoke was sighted to the eastward. This made it clear that the enemy was to the northward and eastward, and that it would be impossible for him to round the Horn Reef without being brought to action. Course was accordingly altered to the eastward, and subsequently to north-eastward, the enemy being sighted at 3.31 p.m. Their force consisted of five battle cruisers.
After the first reports of the enemy the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons changed their direction, and, without waiting for orders, spread to the east, thereby forming a screen in advance of the Battle Cruiser Squadrons and 5th Battle Squadron by the time we had hauled up to the course of approach. They engaged enemy light cruisers at long range. In the meantime the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron had come in at high speed, and was able to take station ahead of the battle cruisers by the time we turned to E.S.E., the course on which we first engaged the enemy. In this respect the work of the Light Cruiser Squadrons was excellent and of great value.
From a report from 'Galatea,' at 2.25 p.m. it was evident that the enemy force was considerable, and not merely an isolated unit of light cruisers, so at 2.45 p.m. I ordered 'Engadine' (Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson) to send up a seaplane and scout to N.N.E. This order was carried out very quickly, and by 3.8 p.m. a seaplane, with Flight Lieutenant F. J. Rutland, R.N., as pilot, and Assistant Paymaster G. S. Trewin, R.N., as observer, was well under way; her first reports of the enemy were received in 'Engadine' about 3.30 p.m. Owing to clouds it was necessary to fly very low, and in order to identify four enemy light cruisers the seaplane had to fly at a height of 900 ft. within 3,000 yards of them, the light cruisers opening fire on her with every gun that would bear. This in no way interfered with the clarity of their reports, and both Flight Lieutenant Rutland and Assistant Paymaster Trewin are to be congratulated on their achievement, which indicates that seaplanes under such circumstances are of distinct value.
At 3.30 p.m. I increased speed to 25 knots and formed line of battle, the 2nd Battle Cruiser Squadron forming astern of the 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, with destroyers of the 13th and 9th Flotillas taking station ahead. I turned to E.S.E., slightly converging on the enemy, who were now at a range of 23,000
yards, and formed the ships on a line of bearing to clear the smoke. The 5th Battle Squadron, who had conformed to our movements, were now bearing N.N.W., 10,000 yards. The visibility at this time was good, the sun behind us and the wind S.E. Being between the enemy and his base, our situation was both tactically and strategically good.
At 3.48 p.m. the action commenced at a range of 18,500 yards, both forces opening fire practically simultaneously. Course was altered to the southward, and subsequently the mean direction was S.S.E., the enemy steering a parallel course distant about 18,000 to 14,500 yards.
At 4.8 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron came into action and opened fire at a range of 20,000 yards. The enemy's fire now seemed to slacken. The destroyer 'Landrail' (Lieutenant-Commander Francis E. H. G. Hobart), of the 9th Flotilla, which was on our port beam, trying to take station ahead, sighted the periscope of a submarine on her port quarter. Though causing considerable inconvenience from smoke, the presence of 'Lydiard' (Commander Malcolm L. Goldsmith) and 'Landrail' undoubtedly preserved the battle-cruisers from closer submarine attack. 'Nottingham' (Captain Charles B. Miller) also reported a submarine on the starboard beam. Eight destroyers of the 13th. Flotilla, 'Nestor' (Commander the Hon. Edward B. S. Bingham), 'Nomad ' (Lieutenant-Commander Paul Whitfield), 'Nicator' (Lieutenant Jack E. A. Mocatta), 'Narborough' (Lieutenant-Commander Geoffrey Corlett), 'Pelican' (Lieutenant-Commander Kenneth A. Beattie), 'Petard' (Lieutenant-Commander Evelyn C. O. Thomson), 'Obdurate' (Lieutenant-Cecil H. H. Sams), 'Nerissa' (Lieutenant-Commander Montague C. B. Legge), with 'Moorsom' (Commander John C. Hodgson) and 'Morris' (Lieutenant-Commander Edward S. Graham), of 10th Flotilla, 'Turbulent' (Lieutenant-Commander Dudley Stuart), 'Termagant' (Lieutenant-Commander Cuthbert P. Blake), of the 9th Flotilla, having been ordered to attack the enemy with torpedoes when opportunity offered, moved out at 4.15 p.m. simultaneously with a similar movement on the part of the enemy's destroyers. The attack was carried out in the most gallant manner and with great determination. Before arriving at a favourable position to fire torpedoes they intercepted an enemy force consisting of a light cruiser and 15 destroyers. A fierce engagement ensued at close quarters, with the result that the enemy were forced to retire on their battle-cruisers, having lost two destroyers sunk and having their torpedo attack frustrated. Our destroyers sustained no loss in this engagement, but their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers was rendered less effective owing to some of the destroyers having dropped astern during the fight. Their position was therefore unfavourable for torpedo attack.
'Nestor,’ 'Nomad’ and 'Nicator,' gallantly led by Commander Hon. E. B. S. Bingham, of 'Nestor,' pressed home their attack on the battle-cruisers and fired two torpedoes at them, being subjected to a heavy fire from the enemy's secondary armament. 'Nomad ' was badly hit and apparently remained stopped between the lines. Subsequently 'Nestor' and 'Nicator' altered course to the S.E., and in a short time, the opposing battle-cruisers having turned 16 points, found themselves within close range of a number of enemy battleships. Nothing daunted, though under a terrific fire, they stood on, and their position being favourable for torpedo attack, fired a torpedo' at the second ship of the enemy line at a range of 3,000 yards. Before they could fire their fourth torpedo Nestor' was badly hit and swung to starboard, 'Nicator’ altering course inside her to avoid collision and thereby being prevented from firing the last torpedo. 'Nicator' made good her escape, and subsequently rejoined the Captain D, 13th Flotilla. 'Nestor' remained stopped, but was afloat when last seen. 'Moorsom' also carried out an attack on the enemy's Battle Fleet.
'Petard,' 'Nerissa,' Turbulent ' and 'Termagant' also pressed home their attack on the enemy battle-cruisers, firing torpedoes after the engagement with enemy destroyers. 'Petard ' reports that all her torpedoes must have crossed the enemy's line, while Nerissa ' states that one torpedo appeared to strike the rear ship. These destroyer attacks were indicative of the spirit pervading His Majesty's Navy, and were worthy of its highest traditions. I propose to bring to your notice a recommendation of Commander Bingham and other Officers for some recognition of their conspicuous gallantry.
From 4.15 to 4.43 p.m. the conflict between the opposing battle-cruisers was of a very fierce and resolute character. The 5th Battle Squadron was engaging the enemy's rear ships, unfortunately at very long range. Our fire began to tell, the accuracy and rapidity of that of the enemy depreciating considerably. At 4.18 p.m. the third enemy ship was seen to be on fire. The visibility to the north-eastward had become considerably reduced, and the outline of the ships very indistinct.
At 4.38 p.m. 'Southampton' (Commodore William E. Goodenough, M.V.O., A.D .C.) reported the enemy's Battle Fleet ahead. The destroyers were recalled, and at 4.42 p.m. the enemy's Battle Fleet was sighted S.E. Course was altered 16 points in succession to starboard, and I proceeded on a northerly course to lead them towards the Battle Fleet. The enemy battle-cruisers altered course shortly afterwards, and the action continued. 'Southampton,' with the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron, held on to the southward to observe. They closed to within 13,000 yards of the enemy Battle Fleet, and came under a very heavy but ineffective fire. 'Southampton's' reports were most valuable. The 5th Battle Squadron were now closing on an opposite course and engaging the enemy battle-cruisers with all guns. The position of the enemy Battle Fleet was communicated to them, and I ordered them to alter course 16 points. Led by Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas in 'Barham' (Captain Arthur W. Craig), this squadron sup-ported us brilliantly and effectively.
At 4.57 p.m. the 5th Battle Squadron turned up astern of me and came under the fire of the leading ships of the enemy Battle Fleet. 'Fearless' (Captain (D) Charles O. Roper), with the destroyers of 1st Flotilla, joined the battle-cruisers and, when speed admitted, took station ahead. 'Champion' (Captain (D) James U. Faris), with 13th Flotilla, took station on the 5th Battle Squadron. At 5 p.m. the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons, which had been following me on the southerly course, took station on my starboard bow; the 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron took station on my port quarter.
The weather conditions now became unfavourable, our ships being silhouetted against a clear horizon to the westward, while the enemy were for the most part obscured by mist, only showing up clearly at intervals. These conditions prevailed until we had turned their van .at about 6 p.m. Between 5 and 6 p.m. the action continued on a northerly course, the range being about 14,000 yards. During this time the enemy received very severe punishment, and one of their battle-cruisers quitted the line in a considerably damaged condition. This came under my personal observation, and was corroborated by ' Princess Royal' (Captain Walter H. Cowan, M.V.O., D.S O.) and ' Tiger ' (Captain Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.). Other enemy ships also showed signs of increasing injury. At 5.5 p.m. 'Onslow' (Lieutenant-Commander John C. Tovey), and 'Moresby' (Lieutenant-Commander Roger V. Alison), who had been detached to assist 'Engadine' with the seaplane, rejoined the Battle Cruiser Squadrons, and took station on the starboard (engaged) bow of ' Lion' (Captain Alfred E. M. Chatfield, C.V.O.). At 5.10 p.m. 'Moresby,' being 2 points before the beam of the leading enemy ship, fired a torpedo at a ship in their line. Eight minutes later she observed a hit with a torpedo on what was judged to be the sixth ship in the line. 'Moresby' then passed between the lines to clear the range of smoke and rejoined 'Champion.' In corroboration of this 'Fearless' reports having seen an enemy heavy ship heavily on fire at about 5.10 p.m. and shortly afterwards a huge cloud of smoke and steam.
At 5.35 p.m. our course was N.N.E., and the estimated position of the Battle Fleet was N. 16 W., so we gradually hauled to the north-eastward, keeping the range of the enemy at 14,000 yards. He was 'gradually hauling to the eastward, receiving severe punishment at the head of his line, and probably acting on information received from his light cruisers, which had sighted, and were engaged with, the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron. Possibly Zeppelins were present also. At 5.50 p.m. British cruisers were sighted on the port bow, and at 5.56 p.m. the leading battleships of the Battle Fleet, bearing north 5 miles. I thereupon altered course to east, and proceeded at utmost speed. This brought the range of the enemy down to 12,000 yards. I made a report to you that the enemy battle-cruisers bore south-east. At this time only three of the enemy battle-cruisers were visible, closely followed by battleships of the ' Koenig ' class.
At about 6.5 p.m. 'Onslow,' being on the engaged bow of 'Lion,' sighted an enemy light cruiser at a distance of 6,000 yards from us, apparently endeavouring to attack with torpedoes. 'Onslow' at once closed and engaged her, firing 58 rounds at a range of from 4,000 to 2,000 yards, scoring a number of hits. 'Onslow ' then closed the enemy battle-cruisers, and orders were given for all torpedoes to be fired. At this moment she was struck amidships by a heavy shell, with the result that only one torpedo was fired. Thinking that all his torpedoes had gone, the commanding officer proceeded to retire at slow speed. Being informed that he still had three torpedoes, he closed the light cruiser previously engaged, and torpedoed her. The enemy's Battle Fleet was then sighted, and the remaining torpedoes were fired at them, and must have crossed the enemy's track. Damage then caused 'Onslow' to stop.
At 7.15 p.m. 'Defender' (Lieutenant-Commander Lawrence R. Palmer), whose speed had been reduced to 10 knots while on the disengaged side of the battle-cruisers by a 12-inch shell, which damaged her foremost boiler, closed 'Onslow' and took her in tow. Shells were falling all round them during this operation, which, however, was successfully accomplished. During the heavy weather of the ensuing night the tow parted twice, but was re-secured. The two struggled on together until 1 p.m. 1st June, when 'Onslow' was transferred to tugs. I consider the performances of these two destroyers to be gallant in the extreme, and I am recommending Lieut.- Commander J. C. Tovey of 'Onslow' and Lieut.-Commander L. R. Palmer of 'Defender' for special recognition. 'Onslow' was possibly the destroyer referred to by Rear-Admiral Commanding 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron as follows:-
"Here I should like to bring to your notice the action of a destroyer (name unknown) which we passed close in a disabled condition soon after 6 p.m. She apparently was able to struggle ahead again and made straight for the 'Derfflinger' to attack her."

At 6.20 p.m. the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron appeared ahead, steaming South towards the enemy's van. I ordered them to take station ahead, which was carried out magnificently, Rear-Admiral Hood bringing his squadron into action ahead in a most inspiring manner, worthy of his great naval ancestors. At 6.25 p.m. I altered course to the E.S.E. in support of the Third Battle Cruiser Squadron, who were at this time only 8,000 yards from the enemy's leading ship. They were pouring a hot fire into her and caused her to turn to the Westward of South. At the same time I made a report to you of the bearing and distance of the enemy Battle Fleet.
By 6.50 p.m. the battle cruisers were clear of our leading Battle Squadron then bearing about N.N.W. 3 miles from ' Lion,' and I ordered the 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron to prolong the line astern and reduced to 18 knots. The visibility at this time was very indifferent, not more than 4 miles, and the enemy ships were temporarily lost sight of. It is interesting to note that after 6 p.m., although the visibility became reduced, it was undoubtedly more favourable to us than to the enemy. At intervals their ships showed up clearly, enabling us to punish them very severely and establish a definite superiority over them. From the reports of other ships and my own observation it was clear that the enemy suffered considerable damage, battle-cruisers and battleships alike. The head of their line was crumpled up, leaving battleships as targets for the majority of our battle cruisers. Before leaving us the 5th Battle Squadron was also engaging battleships. The report of Rear-Admiral Evan-Thomas shows that excellent results were obtained, and it can be safely said that his magnificent squadron wrought great execution.
From the report of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., the 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron, which had maintained its station on our starboard bow well ahead of the enemy, at 6.25 p.m. attacked with the torpedo. 'Falmouth' (Captain John D. Edwards) and 'Yarmouth' (Captain Thomas D. Pratt) both fired torpedoes at the leading enemy battle-cruiser, and it is believed that one torpedo hit, as a heavy underwater explosion was observed. The 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron then gallantly attacked the heavy ships with gunfire, with impunity to themselves, thereby demonstrating that the fighting efficiency of the enemy had been seriously impaired. Rear-Admiral Napier deserves great credit for his determined and effective attack. 'Indomitable' (Captain Francis W. Kennedy) reports that about this time one of the 'Derfflinger' class fell out of the enemy's line.
At 7.6 p.m. I received a signal from you that the course of the Fleet was South. Subsequently signals were received up to 8.46 p.m. showing that the course of the Battle Fleet was to the South-westward. Between 7 and 7.12 p.m. we hauled round gradually to S.W. by S. to regain touch with the enemy, and at 7.14 p.m. again sighted them at a range of about 15,000 yards. The ships sighted at this time were two battle-cruisers and two battleships, apparently of the 'Koenig' class. No doubt more continued the line to the Northward, but that was all that could be seen. The visibility having improved considerably as the sun descended below the clouds, we re-engaged at 7.17 p.m. and increased speed to 22 knots. At 7.32 p.m. my course was S.W., speed 18 knots, the leading enemy battleship bearing N.W. by W. Again after a very short time the enemy showed signs of punishment, one ship being on fire, while another appeared to drop right astern. The destroyers at the head of the enemy's line emitted volumes of grey smoke, covering their capital ships as with a pall, under cover of which they turned away, and at 7.45 p.m. we lost sight of them.
At 7.58 p.m. I ordered the 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons to sweep to the Westward and locate the head of the enemy's line, and at 8.20 p.m. we altered course to West in support. We soon located two battle-cruisers and battleships, and were heavily engaged at a short range of about 10,000 yards. The leading ship was hit repeatedly by Lion,' and turned away 8 points, emitting very high flames and with a heavy list to port. 'Princess Royal' set fire to a three-funnelled battleship; 'New Zealand' (Captain John F. E Green) and 'Indomitable' report that the third ship, which they both engaged, hauled out of the line heeling over and on fire. The mist which now came down enveloped them, and Falmouth ' reported they were last seen at 8.38 p.m. steaming to the Westward.
At 8.40 p.m. all our battle-cruisers felt a heavy shock as if struck by a mine or torpedo, or possibly sunken wreckage. As, however, examination of the bottoms reveals no sign of such an occurrence, it is assumed that it indicated the blowing up of a great vessel.
I continued on a south-westerly course with my light cruisers spread until 9.24 p.m.
Nothing further being sighted, I assumed that the enemy were to the North-westward, and that we had established ourselves well between him and his base. 'Minotaur' (Captain. Arthur C. S. H. D'Aeth) was at this time bearing North 5 miles, and I asked her the position of the leading Battle Squadron of the Battle Fleet. Her reply was that it was not in sight, but was last seen bearing N.N.E. I kept you informed of my position, course and speed, also of the bearing of the enemy.
In view of the gathering darkness, and of the fact that our strategical position was such as to make it appear certain that' we should locate the enemy at daylight under most favourable circumstances, I did not consider it desirable or proper to close the enemy Battle Fleet during the dark hours. I therefore concluded that I should be carrying out your wishes by turning to the course of the Fleet, reporting to you that I had done so.
The 13th Flotilla, under the command of Captain James U. Faris, in 'Champion,' took station astern of the Battle Fleet for the night. At 0.30 a.m. on Thursday, 1st June, a large vessel crossed the rear of the flotilla at high speed. She passed close to 'Petard' and 'Turbulent,' switched on searchlights, and opened a heavy fire, which disabled 'Turbulent.' At 3.30 a.m. 'Champion' was engaged for a few minutes with four enemy destroyers. 'Moresby' reports four ships of 'Deutschland' class sighted at 2.35 a.m., at whom she fired one torpedo. Two minutes later an explosion was felt by 'Moresby' and 'Obdurate.'
'Fearless' and the let Flotilla were very usefully employed as a submarine screen during the earlier part of the 31st May. At 6.10 p.m., when joining the Battle Fleet, 'Fearless' was unable to follow the battle cruisers without fouling the battleships, and therefore took station at the rear of the line.
She sighted during the night a battleship of the 'Kaiser' class steaming fast and entirely alone. She was not able to engage her, but believes she was attacked by destroyers further astern. A heavy explosion was observed astern not long after.
The 1st and 3rd Light Cruiser Squadrons were almost continuously in touch with the battle cruisers, one or both squadrons being usually ahead. In this position they were of great value. They very effectively protected the head of our line from torpedo attack by light cruisers or destroyers, and were prompt in helping to regain touch when the enemy's line was temporarily lost sight of.
The 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron was at the rear of our battle line during the night, and at 9 p.m. assisted to repel a destroyer attack on the 5th Battle Squadron. They were also heavily engaged at 10.20 p.m. with five enemy cruisers or light cruisers, Southampton' and Dublin ' (Captain Albert C. Scott) suffering severe casualties during an action lasting about 15 minutes. 'Birmingham' (Captain Arthur A. M. Duff), at 11.30 p.m., sighted two or more heavy ships steering South.
A report of this was received by me at 11.40 p.m. as steering W.S.W. They were thought at the time to be battle cruisers, but it is since considered that they were probably battleships.
The work of 'Engadine' appears to have been most praiseworthy throughout, and of great value. Lieutenant-Commander C. G. Robinson deserves great credit for the skilful and seamanlike manner in which he handled his ship. He actually towed 'Warrior' for 75 miles between 8.40 p.m., 31st May, and 7.15 a.m., 1st June, and was instrumental in saving the lives of her ship's company.
It is impossible to give a definite statement of the losses inflicted on the enemy. The visibility was for the most part low and fluctuating, and caution forbade me to close the range too much with my inferior force.
A review of all the reports which I have received leads me to conclude that the enemy's losses were considerably greater than those which we had sustained, in spite of their superiority, and included battleships, battle-cruisers, light cruisers, and destroyers.
This is eloquent testimony to the very high standard of gunnery and torpedo efficiency of His Majesty's Ships. The control and drill remained undisturbed throughout, in many cases despite heavy damage to material and personnel. Our superiority over the enemy in this respect was very marked, their efficiency becoming rapidly reduced under punishment, while ours was maintained throughout.
As was to be expected, the behaviour of the ships' companies under the terrible conditions of a modern sea battle was magnificent without exception. The strain on their moral was a severe test of discipline and training. Officers and men were imbued with one thought, the desire to defeat the enemy. The fortitude of the wounded was admirable. A report from the Commanding Officer of 'Chester' gives a splendid instance of devotion to duty. Boy (1st class) John Travers Cornwell, of 'Chester,' was mortally wounded early in the action. He nevertheless remained standing alone at a most exposed post, quietly awaiting orders till the end of the action, with the gun's crew dead and wounded all round him. His age was under 16½ years. I regret that he has since died, but I recommend his case for special recognition in justice to his memory, and as an acknowledgment of the high example set by him.
In such a conflict as raged continuously for five hours it was inevitable that we should suffer severe losses. It was necessary to maintain touch with greatly superior forces in fluctuating visibility, often very low. We lost 'Invincible,' 'Indefatigable' and 'Queen Mary,' from which ships there were few survivors. The casualties in other ships were heavy, and I wish to express my deepest regret at the loss of so many gallant comrades, officers and men. They died gloriously.
Exceptional skill was displayed by the Medical Officers of the Fleet. They performed operations and tended the wounded under conditions of extreme difficulty. In some cases their staff was seriously depleted by casualties, and the inevitable lack of such essentials as adequate light, hot water, &c., in ships damaged by shell fire, tried their skill, resource and physical endurance to the utmost.
As usual, the Engine Room Departments of all ships displayed the highest qualities of technical skill, discipline and endurance. High speed is a primary factor in the tactics of the .squadrons under my command, and the Engine Room Departments never fail.

I have already made mention of the brilliant support afforded me by Rear-Admiral H. Evan-Thomas, M.V.O., and the 5th Battle Squadron, and of the magnificent manner in which Rear-Admiral Hon. H. L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., brought his squadron into action. I desire to record my great regret at his loss, which is a national misfortune. I would now bring to your notice the able support rendered to me by Rear-Admiral W. C. Pakenham, C.B., and Rear-Admiral 0. de B. Brock, C.B. In the course of my report I have expressed my appreciation of the good work performed by the Light Cruiser Squadrons under the command respectively of Rear-Admiral T. D. W. Napier, M.V.O., Commodore W. E. Goodenough, M.V.O. and Commodore E. S. Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O. On every occasion these officers anticipated my wishes, and used their forces to the best possible effect.
I desire also to bring to your notice the skill with which their respective ships were handled by the Commanding Officers. With such Flag Officers, Commodores and Captains to support me my task was lightened.
The destroyers of the 1st and 13th Flotillas were handled by their respective Commanding Officers with skill, dash and courage. I desire to record my very great regret at the loss of Captains C. F. Sowerby ('Indefatigable'), C. I. Prowse ('Queen Mary'), and A. L. Cay ('Invincible') all officers of the highest attainments, who can be ill spared at this time of stress.
I wish to endorse the report of the Rear-Admiral Commanding the 5th Battle Squadron as to the ability displayed by the Commanding Officers of his squadron.
In conclusion, I desire to record and bring to your notice the great assistance, that I received on a day of great anxiety and strain from my Chief of the Staff, Captain R. W. Bentinck, whose good judgment was of the greatest help. He was a tower of strength. My Flag Commander, Hon. R. A. R. Plunkett, was most valuable in observing the effect of our fire, thereby enabling me to take advantage of the enemy's discomfiture ; my Secretary, F. T. Spickernell, who made accurate notes of events as they occurred, which proved of the utmost value in keeping the situation clearly before me; my Flag Lieutenant, Commander R. F. Seymour, who maintained efficient communications under the most difficult circumstances, despite the fact that his signalling appliances were continually shot away. All these Officers carried out their duties with great coolness on the manoeuvring platform, where they were fully exposed to the enemy's fire.
In accordance with your wishes, I am forwarding in a separate letter a full list of Officers and Men whom I wish to recommend to your notice.
I have the honour to be, Sir, Your obedient Servant,
David Beatty, Vice-Admiral.
The Commander-in-Chief,
Grand Fleet.
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NOTE. -The list of Ships and Commanding Officers which took part in the action has been withheld from publication for the present in accordance with practice.


GERMAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF REPORT ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND

REPORT BY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE GERMAN HIGH SEA FLEET ON THE BATTLE OF JUTLAND.
Berlin 1916
[Notes.- All times in this report are German (summer time) time, i.e. two hours in advance of Greenwich Mean Time.
The Germans appear to use the words “armoured cruiser” and “battle cruiser” indiscriminately; the literal translation has been adopted.]

INTERIM REPORT BY THE COMMAND OF THE HIGH SEA FORCES ON THE BATTLE OF THE SKAGERRAK.
Commander-in-Chief of the High Sea Forces. July 4, 1916.
Your Royal and Imperial Majesty’s humble servant has the honour to report on the operation of 31 May and 1 June, and the Battle of Skagerrak, as follows:

A. THE OBJECT UNDERLYING THE OPERATION.

The operation against Lowestoft on 23 and 24 April of this year had the effect which our war plan intended it to have.
The enemy justly considered it as a challenge, and was clearly not disposed to submit a second time to a similar blow without opposition. He began to rouse himself. We heard of fresh groupings of his naval forces at the various bases on the East Coast, and of repeated cruises by considerable portions of his Fleet in the northern part of the North Sea.
This situation suited our plans, and I decided to utilize it to the full by making a renewed advance with our whole Fleet as soon as the refit of the SEYDLITZ was complete.
The temporary suspension of the Submarine Warfare against Commerce permitted of the co-operation of all submarines which were ready for sea.
In the middle of May, therefore, I despatched all submarines to sweep through the northern portion of the North Sea, and to take up positions off the enemy’s main bases: i.e., Humber, Firth of Forth, Moray Firth and Scapa Glow, from 23 May onwards, and then to compel the enemy to put to sea, by making an advance with our Fleet, and to give battle under conditions favourable to us.
I hoped by those dispositions to bring the submarines into action and at the same time to utilize them for reconnaissance purposes.
Two operations were prepared, one, an advance in a North-Westerly direction against the English Coast, the other, an advance in a Northerly direction into the Skagerrak.
For the north-Westerly advance, extended scouting by airships was indispensable as it would lead into an area where we could not let ourselves be drawn into an action against our will.
There was less danger of this in the Northerly advance, for the coast of Jutland afforded a certain cover against surprise from the East, and the distances from the enemy’s bases were greater. Aerial reconnaissance, although desirable here also, was not absolutely necessary.
The advance towards the North West promised to be the more effective, and was therefore considered first; consequently all airships were kept in readiness for the operation from 23 May onwards.
Unfortunately the weather was unfavourable for the undertaking. The Gleet waited in vain from 23-30 May far weather favourable for aerial scouting.
The weather on 30 May showing no signs of change, and it being impossible to keep the submarines off the enemy ports any longer, I decided to abandon the North-Westerly advance, and to carry out that towards the North, if necessary, without the assistance of airships.

B. THE PLAN OF OPERATION.

The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, Vice-Admiral Hipper, was ordered to leave the Hade at 4 a.m. on 31 May, with the I and II Scouting Groups, the 2nd Leader of Destroyers in the REGENSBURG and the II, VI and IX Destroyer Flotillas, and to push on to the Skagerrak, keeping out of sight of Horns Reef and the Danish Coast, to show himself before dark off the Norwegian coast, so that the British would receive news of the operation, and to carry out a cruiser and commerce warfare during the late afternoon and the following night off and in the Skagerrak.
The Main Fleet, consisting of the I, II and III Squadrons, IV Scouting Group, 1st Leader of Destroyers in the ROSTOCK and the remainder of the Destroyer Flotillas, was to follow at 4.30 a.m., to cover the Scouting Forces during the operation, and to meet them on the morning of 1 June.
The detached submarines were informed by wireless that the enemy forces might put to sea on 31 May and 1 June.
German Plans I-II.
German Plan I shows the intended operation. German Plan II shows the areas to be swept by the submarines and their distribution off the enemy’s harbours.
The Naval Corps (Flanders)) gladly undertook to block the British Naval Ports in the Hoofden in a similar manner.

C. THE COURSE OF THE OPERATION.

1. Up to the encounter with the enemy.

The Channel swept by our Mineseeking Forces to the West of Amrum Bank, through the enemy minefields, enabled the high Sea Forces to reach the open sea in safety.
Scouting by airship was at first not possible on account of the weather.
At 7.37 a.m. “U.32” reported 2 heavy ships, 2 cruisers and several destroyers about 70 miles east of the Firth of Forth, on a South-Easterly course.
At 8.30 p.m. (sic) the wireless “decoding” station Nemnunster reported that 2 large war vessels or squadrons with destroyers had left Scapa Flow.
At 8.48 a.m. “U.66” reported having sighted, about 60 miles East of Kinnaird Head, 8 enemy heavy ships, light cruisers and destroyers on a North-Easterly course.
The reports gave no indication of the enemy’s intentions. The difference in the composition of the individual units and their divergent (sic-Trans.) course did not show that they intended to co-operate or to advance against the German Bight, or that their movements had any connection whatsoever with our operation.
The reports received did not, therefore, cause us to modify our plans, but only led us to hope that we might succeed in bringing a part of the enemy’s Fleet to action.
Between 2 and 3 p.m., L.9, L.16., L.21, L.23 and L.14 ascended in succession for the purpose of long-distance reconnaissance in the sector between North and West from Heligoland.
They did not succeed in taking part in the action which developed soon afterwards, nor did they observe anything of our Main Fleet or of the enemy, nor did they hear anything of the engagement, although L.14, according to her own reckoning, was over the scene of action at 10 p.m.
The ELBING, the cruiser on the western wing of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces’ screen, despatched the leaderboat of the IV Destroyer Half-flotilla to examine a steamer. At 4.28 p.m. this destroyer reported having sighted some single enemy ships about 90 miles west of Bovberg.

Figure 1. Screen of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces.

Jutland Battle Illustration 1

On sighting our forces, the enemy (8 light cruisers of the CAROLINE class) altered course at once to the North. Our cruisers gave chase, with the result that at 5.20 p.m. the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces sighted two columns of large ships steering about East bearing about West; they were soon recognised to be 6 battle cruisers – 3 LIONS, 1 TIGER, 2 INDEFATIGABLES and light forces.
The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces recalled the II Scouting Group, which was to the North of him in chase of the enemy, and proceeded to attack.
The enemy deployed towards the South and formed line of battle. The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces followed this movement (which was exceedingly welcome, as it afforded us the possibility of drawing the enemy on to our main Fleet); he advanced in quarter line to within effective range, opening fire at 5.49 p.m. at a range of about 13,000 metres (14,217 yards).

2. The first phase of the Battle: the Cruiser Action.

The action took place on a South-Easterly course, its exact progress is shown in German Plan IV.
The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces kept the enemy at an effective distance. His guns were well laid. Hits were registered on all the enemy ships.
By 6.13 p.m. the armoured cruiser INDEFATIGABLE, the last ship in the line, was sunk with a violent explosion by the fire of the VON DER TANN.
The gunnery superiority, and advantageous tactical position were distinctly on our side, until, at 6.19 p.m. a new squadron, consisting of 4 or 5 ships of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class, with a considerable superiority in speed, appeared from a North-Westerly direction, and took part in the action with an opening range of about 20,000 metres (21, 872 yards.
This rendered the position of our cruisers critical.
The new opponent fired with remarkable rapidity and accuracy, the accuracy being partly due to the impossibility of returning his fire.
At 6.26 p.m. the distance between the opposing armoured cruisers was about 12,000 metres (13,123 yards), and between our armoured cruisers and the QUEEN ELIZABETHS about 18,000 metres (19,685 yards).
Of the Flotillas under the orders of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, only the IX Flotilla was at this time in a position from which an attack could be launched.
The 2nd Leader of Destroyers (Commodore Heinrich) in REGENSBURG, with some boats of the II Flotilla, proceeding at utmost speed, was about abreast of the van of the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces. The cruisers of the II Scouting Group, with the remainder of the Flotillas, and, therefore, in spite of taxing their engines to the utmost, had not been able to reach their position in the van of the armoured cruisers.
In view of the situation, the 2nd Leader of Destroyers ordered the IX Flotilla to proceed to relieve the pressure on the battle cruisers. This Flotilla to proceed to relive the pressure on the battle cruisers. This Flotilla was already proceeding to attack on its own initiative, in pursuance of orders given by its Senior Officer, Commander Goehle.

Figure 2: Phase of the battle at 6.26 p.m.

Jutland German account Figure 2

At about 6.30 p.m. the IX Flotilla advanced to the attack under heavy enemy fire. Twelve torpedoes were fired at the enemy line at a range of 9,500-8,000 metres (10,389 – 8,749 yards).
It was not possible to bring off the attack nearer to the enemy, as, simultaneously with the advance of the IX Flotilla, 15 to 20 British destroyers, supported by light cruisers, advanced to counter-attack and to repel our destroyers.
A destroyer action resulted at very close range (1,000 – 1,500 metres) (1093 – 1,640 yards). The REGENSBURG, with those boats of the II Flotilla which were with her, and the medium calibre buns of the armoured cruisers, took part in the conflict. The enemy turned away after about 10 minutes.
On our side V.27 and V.29 were sunk by heavy shell fire. The crews of both boats were rescued under enemy fire by V.26 and S.35.
On the enemy’s side, 2, possibly 3 destroyers were sunk and 2 others so badly damaged that they were left behind and subsequently fell victim to the Main Fleet.
The enemy made no attempt to save the crews of their boats.
During the destroyer attack, the British armoured cruisers were effectively held by the large calibre guns of the I Scouting Group. The latter successfully evaded a large number of enemy torpedoes (observed by the IX Flotilla) by edging away a few points.
Towards 6.30 p.m. a violent explosion was observed on the third enemy armoured cruiser, QUEEN MARY. When the clouds of smoke dispersed the enemy cruiser had disappeared.
Whether her destruction was caused by the guns, or by a torpedo from the armoured cruisers, or by a torpedo from the IX Flotilla is uncertain. It was probably the work of the guns.
In any case the attack by the IX Flotilla resulted in the temporary cessation of the enemy’s fire.
The Senior Officer of Scouting Forces made use of this and ordered the armoured cruisers to turn in succession to a North-Westerly course, thereby ensuring that he would be at the head of the cruisers in the next phase of the action.
Immediately after the torpedo attack, the German Main Fleet appeared on the scene just in time to bring help to the Scouting Forces, which were engaged with the enemy in considerably superior strength.

3. The second phase of the Battle: the Chase.

The Main Fleet was in the order K.312, the Fleet Flagship leading the I Squadron, course North, speed 14 knots, distance apart of ships 700 metres (3½ cables), distance apart of Squadrons 3,500 metres (19 cables), the destroyers screening the Squadrons against submarines, the light cruisers surrounding and screening the Main Fleet.
At 4.28 p.m., when about 50 miles west of Lyngvig, the first information was received of the sighting of enemy light forces, and at 5.35 p.m. the first report came to hand that enemy heavy forces were in sight. The distance between the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces and the Main Fleet was at this time about 50 miles.
On receipt of this report, line of Battle K.312* [*Admiralty Note - ?Keillinei 312 – Single Line ahead in the sequence 3rd Squadron, 1st Squadron, 2nd Squadron.] was closed up, and the order “Clear for Action” given.
The report received at 5.45 p.m. from the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, that he was engaged with 6 enemy armoured cruisers on a South-Easterly course, showed that we had succeeded in bringing some of the enemy to action and in drawing them on to our Main Fleet.
The task of the Main Fleet was now to relieve the materially weaker armoured cruisers as quickly as possible, and to endeavour to cut off a premature retreat of the enemy.
For the latter reason I altered course to North-West at 6.05 p.m., increased to 15 knots, and, a quarter of an hour later, altered course to West in order to bring the enemy between two fires.
Whilst this alteration of course of the Main Fleet was in progress, the II Scouting Group reported that a British Squadron of 5 battleships was joining in the action.
The position of the I Scouting Group, which was now opposed by 6 armoured cruisers and 5 battleships, might become critical.
In consequence everything depended on effecting a junction with the I Scouting Group as soon as possible: I therefore altered course back to North.
At 6.32 p.m. sighted the ships in action.
At 6.45 p.m. the III and I Squadrons were able to open fire, and the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces placed himself and his ships at the head of the Main Fleet.

German Plan VI(1) – Phase of the Battle at 6.55 p.m.
The enemy’s light forces turned immediately towards the West, and as soon as they were out of range, towards the North.
It is doubtful whether they suffered any damage from the fire of our battleships in this short time.
The British armoured cruisers turned in succession to North-West. The QUEEN ELIZABETHS followed in their wake, and thus covered the cruisers, which had suffered severely.
At 6.49 p.m., while the Squadrons were passing each other, the Senior Officer of the VI Flotilla, Commander Max Schultz, attacked with the XI Half-Flotilla. The result could not be observed.
The next phase of the battle became a chase: our Scouting Forces endeavouring to keep on the heels of the enemy battle cruisers, and our main body on those of the QUEEN ELIZABETHS.
With this purpose in view our main body proceeded at utmost speed, and, divisions separately, turned towards 4the enemy as far as North-West.
In spite of this, the enemy’s armoured cruisers succeeded in getting out of range of the I Scouting Group soon after 7 o’clock.
The QUEEN ELIZABETHS were also able to increase their lead to such an extent that they could only be kept under fire by the I Scouting Group and the V Division. The hope that one of the pursued ships would be so badly disabled as to fall to the Main Fleet was not realised, although the shots fell well; at 7.30 p.m. it was clearly observed that a ship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class turned away, after having been hit several times, and withdrew from the battle with diminished speed and with a heavy list to port. The ship was not observed to sink.
In the meantime the ships of the Main Fleet were only able to sink 2 modern destroyers (Nestor and Nomad), which had been disabled during the attack of the IX Flotilla and subsequently overtaken. Their crews were made prisoners.

German Plan VI(2) – Phase of the Battle at 7.15 p.m.
As at 7.20 p.m. the fire of the I Scouting Group and of the ships of the V Division seemed to slacken, I was under the impression that the enemy was succeeding in escaping, and therefore issued an order to the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces, and therewith the permission to all vessels, for the “general chase.”
In the meantime the visibility, which had thitherto been good, became less so. The wind had backed from North-West through West to South-West. Smoke from cordite and funnels hung over the water and obscured all view from North to East.
Our own Scouting Forces were only visible for a few seconds at a time.
As a matter of fact, the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces had been outflanked by enemy battle cruisers and light forces by the time he received the order for the “general chase,” and under their pressure he was forced to turn to the North. He was unable to report this, as intended, for a short time previously the main and auxiliary W/T stations in his Flagship (LUTZOW) had been put out of action by a heavy shell.
The decrease of fire at the head of the line was only due to the setting sun making it more and more difficult and finally practically impossible to range and to spot.
When, therefore, at 7.40 p.m. the enemy’s light forces, grasping the situation, made a torpedo attack against our armoured cruisers, the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces had no alternative but to edge away, and, finally, to order his force to alter course to South-West, and to get into closer touch with our Main Fleet, he being unable to reply effectively to the enemy’s fire.

4. The third phase of the Action: the Battle.

About the same time the pressure from ahead on the van of the Main Fleet caused it to bear away in an Easterly direction.
At 7.48 p.m., therefore, the signal “For on the van” was made, the ships formed into line; the speed was temporarily reduced to 15 knots, in order to give the divisions which had been proceeding at utmost speed an opportunity to re-establish close order, the Fleet having become somewhat extended.
While these operations of the Main Fleet were in progress, the II Scouting Group, under Rear-Admiral Boedicker, got into action with a light cruiser of the CALLIOPE class, which he set on fire. Shortly before 8 p.m. the II Scouting Group encountered several light cruisers of the “Town” class and several battleships, including the AGINCOURT. The haze over the water made it impossible to estimate the whole strength of the enemy. The scouting group was at once caught under heavy fire, to which it replied; it fired torpedoes, and then turned away towards its own Main Fleet. The result could not be observed, as a smoke screen had to be developed at once for the protection of the cruisers. In spite of the smoke screen, the WIESBADEN and PILLAU were heavily hit. The WIESBADEN (Captain Reiss) was unable to proceed and remained stopped under the enemy’s fire.

German Plan VI(3) – Phase of the Battle 7.42-8pm.
The Senior Officers of the XII Half Flotilla and IX Flotilla, which had been astern of the cruisers, recognising the seriousness of the situation, proceeded to attack. Fire was opened on both Flotillas from a line of numerous battleships steaming North-West; the destroyers approached to 6,000 metres (6,561 yards) and then fired 6 torpedoes each at the enemy battleships. In this case also it was impossible to observe the result, for dense clouds of smoke concealed the enemy immediately after turning away.* Both flotillas, however, thought they might claim success, as the attack was made under favourable conditions. [*NOTE: It is not clear in the German whether their destroyers or the British battleships turned away.- Trans]
At about this time the British Main Fleet, under Admiral Jellicoe, must have joined Admiral Beatty’s forces, which had been pursued up to now.
This resulted in heavy fighting from about 8.10-8.35 p.m. in the van of the Main Fleet round the disabled WIESBADEN. In this action the ships also were able to use their torpedoes.
The QUEEN ELIZABETHS, and perhaps Beatty’s battle cruisers, attacked from a North-North-Westerly direction. (It appears, however, from statements made by prisoners, that the battle cruisers took no part in the battle after 7 p.m.) A new squadron of armoured cruisers (3 INVINCIBLES and 4 WARRIORS), besides light cruisers and destroyers, attacked from the North, and the enemy’s battle squadrons attacked from the North-East to East.

German Plan VI(4) – Phase of the Battle at 8.16 p.m.
It was principally the I Scouting Group and the leading ships of the III Squadron that had to repulse the attack. During this attack the armoured cruisers were forced to turn away so sharply, that at 8.35 p.m. I was obliged to turn the line by a “Battle turn” to starboard together, to West.

German Plan VI(5) – Phase of the Battle at 8.35 p.m.
While our line was being inverted, two boats of the III Flotilla (G.88 and V.73) and the leader boat of the I Flotilla (S.32) attacked. The remainder of the III Flotilla had broken off their attack, having been recalled by the 1st Leader of Destroyers. The latter had issued this order on observing the slackening in the enemy’s fire, which convinced him that the enemy had turned away, and that the Flotilla, which would be urgently required later on in the action, was being launched into a void. Owing to the embarrassment of the van, the boats of the remaining flotillas were not able to attack. Some of them (IX and VI Flotillas) were just returning from the 8 p.m. attack.
Immediately after the inversion of the line the enemy temporarily ceased firing, partly because they lost sight of us in the smoke screen developed by the destroyers for the protection of our line, and particularly of our armoured cruisers, but mainly no doubt, on account of the appreciable losses they had suffered.
The following ships were definitely seen to sink: A ship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class (name not know); a battle cruiser (INVINCIBLE); two armoured cruisers (BLACK PRINCE and DEFENCE); a light cruiser and two destroyers (one of which was marked 04).
The following ships were heavily damaged, some being set on fire: one armoured cruiser (WARRIOR) which subsequently sank; three light cruisers and three destroyers.
On our side only V.48 was sunk; WIESBADEN rendered not under control; and LUTZOW was so badly damaged that the Senior Officer of Scouting Forces was forced to leave the ship about 9 p.m. under enemy fire and transfer to MOLTKE.
On this account the Command of the I Scouting Group devolved till 11 p.m. on the Commanding Officer of the DERFFLINGER (Captain Hartog).
The remaining armoured cruisers and van ships of the III Squadron had suffered too but they kept their station in the line. After the enemy had been obliged to cease firing at our line, which was proceeding West, they attacked the already badly damaged WIESBADEN. It could be clearly seen that the ship defended herself bravely against over-whelming odds.
It was as yet too early to assume “night cruising order.” The enemy could have compelled us to fight before dark, he could have prevented our exercising our initiative, and finally he could have cut off our return to the German Bight.
There was only one way of avoiding this: to deal the enemy a second blow by again advancing regardless of consequences, and to bring all the destroyers to attack.
This manoeuvre would necessarily have the effect of surprising the enemy, upsetting his plans for the rest of the day, and, if the attack was powerful enough, of facilitating our extricating ourselves for the night. In addition this afforded us the opportunity of making a final effort to succour the hard-pressed WIESBADEN, or at least to rescue her crew.
Consequently, at 8.55 p.m. the line was again turned to starboard on to an Easterly course, the armoured cruisers were ordered to attack the head of the enemy’s line as fiercely as possible, all flotillas were given the order to attack, and instructions were issued to the 1st Leader of Destroyers (Commodore Michelsen) to transfer the crew of the WIESBADEN to his boats.
The action brought about by this movement soon developed similarly to that of 8.35 p.m., except that our van was still further embarrassed.

German Plan VI(7) – Phase of the Battle at 9.17 p.m.
The destroyers sent to the WIESBADEN had to abandon their attempt to rescue the crew. The WIESBADEN and the advancing boats were under such heavy fire that the Senior Officer of the Flotilla considered it useless to risk the latter. While turning away, V.73 and G.88 fired a total of 4 torpedoes at the QUEEN ELIZABETHS.
The fire directed against our line was mainly concentrated on the armoured cruisers and the V Division. These ships suffered very severely, as they were able to distinguish little more of the enemy than the flashes of his salvoes, whereas they themselves apparently offered good targets.
The conduct of the armoured cruisers is especially deserving of the highest praise. Although a number of their guns were unable to fire and some of the ships themselves were severely damaged, they nevertheless advanced recklessly towards the enemy, in compliance with their orders.
The handling of the III Squadron (Rear-Admiral Behneke) and the behaviour of the ships of the V Division were equally praiseworthy. They and the armoured cruisers bore the brunt of the battle, thereby making it possible for the flotillas to attack with effect.
The boats of the VI and IX Flotillas, which were in the van with the cruisers, were the first to attack. The III and V Flotillas, stationed with the Main Fleet, followed suit.
The Flotilla was held back for the time being by its Senior Officer, in order to prevent it from advancing into a void in the rear of the VI and IX Flotillas. This measure was justified by subsequent events. The I Half-Flotilla and a few boats of the VI and IX Flotillas were occupied in screening the damaged LUTZOW. There was no further opportunity for the approaching VII Flotilla to attack.
At 9.17 p.m. a “battle turn” together was therefore made, the line proceeding first on a Westerly course and then altering by a turn in succession to South-West, South and finally South-East, in order to counter the enveloping movement of the enemy, whose van already bore South-East, and to keep a line of retreat open for us.
Shortly after our turn, the enemy ceased fire.
The enemy must have turned away during the attack by the VI and IX Flotillas, as the III and V Flotillas only sighted light forces, and therefore had not opportunity of attacking.
The casualties sustained by the enemy in this phase of the battle cannot be given. Up to the present the only information received is that the MARLBOROUGH was struck by a torpedo. However, it may be taken for certain that other successes were obtained.
Our armoured cruisers and the ships in the van of the III Squadron had suffered severely. Nevertheless, all ships were able to keep station in the “night cruising order” at the high speed of 16 knots; even the LUTZOW was proceeding at medium speed when she was seen last at 9.30 p.m., abreast of the Fleet Flagship.

5. Movements and actions during the night.

The reports made by the flotillas, regarding the strength of the enemy sighted by them, made it certain that we had been in action against the whole British Fleet.
It might be taken for granted that the enemy would endeavour to force us to the Westward by attacks with strong forces during the hours of dusk, and by destroyer attacks during the night, in order to force us to give battle at daybreak. They were strong enough to do so.
Should we succeed in checking the enemy’s enveloping movement and reaching Horns Reef before them, we should retain the initiative for the next morning.
With this object in view, all destroyer flotillas had to be used for attacking during the night, even at the risk of having to do without them in the new engagements which might be expected at dawn. The Main Fleet itself had to make for Horns Reef, in close order, by the shortest route, and to maintain this course in defiance of all attacks of enemy.

German Plan VII
Orders to this effect were issued. At the same time the Leader of Submarines ordered all submarines in Borkum Roads to advance to the North.
The Senior Officers of the Destroyer Forces stationed the flotillas on a line East-North-East and South-South-West, that is in the direction from which the enemy’s Main Fleet was expected to pursue.
A large number of the boats had already expended their torpedoes during the day actions; some had been left behind to protect the severely damaged LUTZOW; some were retained by their Senior Officers in order to have them at their disposal in case of need. Thanks to this decision it was possible to rescue the crews of the ELBING and ROSTOCK later on.
Only the II, V, VII and portions of the VI and IX Flotillas therefore advanced to attack. The boats had various night actions with light forces of the enemy; they saw nothing of his Main Fleet. At daybreak L.24 sighted a portion of the Main Fleet in the “Jammerbucht.” [Jammer Bight in the Skagerrak.] The enemy had, therefore, drawn off to the North after that battle.
The II Flotilla, to which the Northern part of the sector was allotted, was forced away by cruisers and destroyers, and returned via The Skaw. The 2nd Leader of Destroyers allowed it to use its discretion regarding this route.
The remaining flotillas assembled at dawn with the Main Fleet.
Before it became quite dark, the Main Fleet had a short but serious encounter with the enemy. At 10.20 p.m., while the I and II Scouting Groups were endeavouring to take station ahead, they were subjected to heavy fire from a South-Easterly direction. Only the flashes of the enemy’s salvoes could be seen. The ships which were already severely damaged received further hits without being able to make any serious reply to the fire. They, therefore, turned away and took up a position on the disengaged side, pushing themselves between the II and I Squadrons.

German Plan VI(*) – Sketch for 10.30 p.m.
The van of the I Squadron followed the movement of the cruisers, whereas the II Squadron (Rear-Admiral Mauve) continued on its course, thus drawing the enemy’s fire. As the II Squadron recognised that light conditions made a reply impossible, it edged away in order to draw the enemy towards the I Squadron. The enemy did not pursue, but ceased firing.
At about the same time the IV Scouting Group (Commodore von Reuter) was in action under identical conditions with 4-5 cruisers, including ships of the HAMPSHIRE class.
Bearing in mind that the van of the Main Fleet in particular would be called upon to repulse enemy attacks, and in order to have the main strength in the van at daybreak, the II Squadron was ordered to take station astern. The I Scouting Group became the rearguard, the II Scouting Group became the vanguard, and the IV Scouting Group was entrusted with the screening of the starboard side.
The battle squadrons therefore proceeded in the following order: I Squadron, Fleet Flagship, III Squadron, II Squadron, the I and III Squadrons in inverse order. WESTFALEN (Captain Redlich) was leading ship of the line.
During the night the enemy attacked practically uninterruptedly from the East with light forces, and at times also with heavy forces.
The II and IV Scouting Groups, and particularly the ships of the I Squadron (Vice-Admiral Schmidt) had to repulse these attacks. The result was excellent.
At 2.0 a.m. an armour cruiser of the CRESSY class (name not known), entirely misjudging the situation, approached the rear ships of the I Squadron and the Fleet Flagship to within 1,500 metres (1,645). In a few minutes she was set on fire by our guns and sank, 4 minutes after fire was opened, with terrific explosions.
According to careful estimation 1 armoured cruiser, 1 light cruiser and 7 destroyers were sunk during the night, and several light cruisers and destroyers were badly damaged.
Our losses were the FRAUENLOB, POMMERN and V.4. The ROSTOCK and ELBING had to be abandoned and blown up. The FRAUENLOB (Captain Hoffman, Georg) was hit by a torpedo at 12.45 a.m. while the IV Scouting Group were in action with 4 cruisers of the “Town” class. According to the statement of some of the few survivors, she sank soon afterwards, fighting to the last. The POMMERN (Captain Bolken) was torpedoed at 4.20 a.m., and blew up with a tremendous explosion. V.$ ran on an enemy mine at 4.50 a.m. The crew were saved.
At 1.30 a.m. the ROSTOCK and ELBING became engaged with destroyers, on the port side abreast of the van of the I Squadron; they were at last compelled to turn away from the enemy’s torpedoes and break through the line of the I Squadron in order not to hamper the fire of our battleships.
During this manoeuvre the ROSTOCK was hit by a torpedo, while the ELBING collided with the POSEN.
Both cruisers were unable to manoeuvre. The ROSTOCK remained afloat until 5.45 a.m., and was then blown up, on hostile cruisers being sighted, after the entire crew including the wounded had been transferred to boats of the III Flotilla. The crew of the ELBING were also taken on board a boat of the III Flotilla, only the Commanding Officer, the executive officer, the torpedo officer and a cutter’s crew remaining on board in order to keep the ship afloat as long as possible. On hostile forces being sighted at 4 a.m., the ELBING had to be blown up too. The crew who had remained on board escaped in the cutter, were picked up later by a Dutch trawler and returned home via Holland.
The LUTZOW was kept afloat until 3.45 a.m. Towards the end the ship was navigated from the afterbridge. All attempts to stop the water from rushing in were in vain, the fore part of the ship had suffered too severely. Finally the ship had about 7.000 tons of water in her. The forecastle was flooded up to the truck of the Jack staff. The propellers revolved out of water. The ship had to be abandoned. The crew, including all the wounded, were transferred to the destroyers G.40, G.37, G.38 and V.45, and LUTZOW was sunk by a torpedo. The 4 destroyers had altogether 1,250 men of the LUTZOW on boar. On two occasions they encountered enemy cruisers and destroyers, and on both occasions they attacked under the leadership of the Senior Commanding Officer (Lieutenant-Commander Beitzen, Richard), and successfully fought their way back to the German Bight. During the last action the engines of G.40 were hit, and she had to be taken in tow.
When the Main Fleet received information of this, the 2nd Leader of Destroyers in the REGENSBURG turned back and met the tow. S.32, leader boat of the I Flotilla (Lieutenant-Commander Frohlich), was hit at 1 a.m. by a heavy shell in the boiler room and was temporarily disabled. However, by feeding the boilers with sea water, the Commanding Officer succeeded in reaching Danish territorial waters. Destroyers which had been sent out then towed her home through Nordmanns Deep.

6. The situation on the morning of 1st June.

During the night, L.11, L.13, L.17, L.22 and L.24 ascended to make an early reconnaissance.
At 5.10 a.m. L.11 reported a group of 12 British battleships, numerous light forces and destroyers on a Northerly course about the middle of the line Tershelling-Horns Reef, and, immediately afterwards, 6 large enemy battleships and three battle cruisers to the north of the first-mentioned group. The airship came under heavy fire, but kept in touch. Shortly after having been sighted, the enemy altered course to the West and were lost to sight in thick weather.
At 4 a.m. L.24 sighted a flotilla of enemy destroyers and about 6 submarines 50 miles West of Bovberg. The airship was fired at and replied by dropping bombs; then scouting further to the North, she discovered at 5 a.m., in the Jammerbucht, a group of 12 large battleships and numerous cruisers, which were proceeding South at high speed. It was impossible to keep touch and to reconnoitre further, as the clouds were only 800 m. (2,624 feet) above the water.
At daybreak the Main Fleet itself saw nothing of the enemy. The weather was so thick that one could hardly see the length of a squadron.
The reports received from the armoured cruisers showed that the I Scouting Group could no longer fight a serious action. The ships in the van of the III Squadron must also have lost in fighting value.
Of the fast light cruisers only the FRANKFURT, PILLAU, and REGENSBURG were at my disposal.
Owing to the bad visibility, further scouting y airships could not be counted on. It was, therefore, hopeless to try and force a regular action on the enemy reported to the South. The consequences of such an encounter would have been a matter of chance. I therefore abandoned any further operations and gave the order to return to base.
On the way back, when to the West of List, the OSTFRIESLAND ran on a mine, in a minefield which we knew nothing of and which apparently had been laid by the enemy shortly before. The ship was able to enter harbour under her own steam.
Several submarine attacks on our returning Main Fleet were unsuccessful, thanks partly to the watchfulness of our aircraft, which joined the Main Fleet off List and accompanied it to the estuaries.
All ships and destroyers retuned to the estuaries during the course of the day.
Special mention must be made of the bringing in of the severely damaged SEYDLITZ (Captain von Egidy). It is due to the admirable seamanship of the Commanding Officer and his crew that the ship was able to reach harbour.
The submarines which left the Ems were ordered to look for the ELBING and for the damaged ships of the enemy. The submarines off the English ports were ordered to make every endeavour to remain on their stations for one day more.
At 6.20 p.m. U.46 met a damaged ship of the IRON DUKE class (MARLBOROUGH) about 60 miles north of Terschelling. She fired a torpedo, but missed. Of the submarines which lay off the enemy’s harbours, U.B.21 hit an enemy destroyer on 31 May, and U.52 one on 1 June. Owing to hostile counter-measures the sinking in neither case was observed.

D. THE LOSSES ON EITHER SIDE.

According to a careful appreciation of the observations made by us, the enemy losses were:-
1 large battleship of the QUEEN ELIZABETH class (28,500 tons)
3 battle cruisers (QUEEN MARY, INDEFATIGABLE, INVINCIBLE) (63,000 tons)
4 armoured cruisers (BLACK PRINCE, DEFENCE, WARRIOR, and one of the CRESSY class) (53,700 tons)
2 light cruisers (9,000 tons)
13 destroyers (15,000 tons.
Total tonnage: 169,200 tons

Our losses were:-
1 battle cruiser (LUTZOW) (26.700 tons)
1 old battleship (POMMERN) (13,200 tons)
4 light cruisers (WIESBADEN, ELBING, ROSTOCK, FRAUENLOB) (17,150 tons)
5 destroyers (3,680 tons)
Total tonnage: 60,730 tons

The losses of the enemy are, practically without exception, total losses, whereas we were able to rescue the crews of the LUTZOW, ELBING, ROSTOCK, and half the crews of the destroyers.
We expended 3,596 heavy shells, 3,921 medium and 2,962 small calibre shells and 107 torpedoes.

E. SUMMARY

The success obtained is due to the fact that our Squadron and Flotilla Leaders were filled with zeal for battle, and realised the object of the undertaking, and to the excellent work performed by the ships’ companies, who were imbued with the greatest martial ardour.
Its achievement was only rendered possible by the quality of our ships and armament, the fact that the peace training of the units was conscious of its object, and by the conscientious training carried out in individual ships.
The large amount of experience gained will be exploited with the greatest care.
The battle has proved that in building up our Fleet, and in the development of the individual types of our ships, we have been guided by correct strategical and tactical views, and that we should, therefore, continue on the same lines.
All arms have borne their share in this result, the decisive factor was, however, both directly and indirectly, the long range heavy armament of the LARGER VESSELS. It caused the greater part of the known losses inflicted on the enemy, and it enabled the flotillas to carry out a successful attack against the enemy’s Main Fleet. The above observation in no way detracts from the merit of the flotilla, whose attack on the enemy battlefleet was finally successful in enabling us to break away completely from the enemy.
The LARGE WAR VESSEL, battleship and cruiser, is and remains, therefore, the foundation of Sea Power, and should be further developed by enlarging the calibre of the guns, increasing the speed and perfecting the armour above and below water.

F. THE FURTHER CONDUCT OF OUR NAVAL WAR.

In conclusion I have the honour respectfully to report to Your Majesty that, with the exception of the DERFFLINGER and SEYDLITZ, the High Sea Fleet will be ready for further battles by the middle of August.
Should the future operations take a favourable course, it may be possible to inflict appreciable damage on the enemy; but there can be no doubt that even the most favourable issue of a battle on the high seas WILL NOT COMPEL ENGLAND to make peace in THIS war. The disadvantages of our geographical position compared with that of the Island Empire, and her great material superiority, cannot be compensated for by our Fleet to a degree which will enable us to overcome the blockade instituted against us, or to overpower the Island Empire herself, even if all our submarines are fully available for military purposes.
A victorious termination of the war within measurable time can only be attained by destroying the economic existence of Great Britain, namely, by the employment of submarines against British commerce.
In the conviction that it is my duty, I must continue respectfully to dissuade Your Majesty from adopting any modified form of this warfare, because it would mean reducing this weapon to an anomaly and because the results would probably not be in proportion to the risk incurred by the boats. Further, even with the most conscientious care on the part of the Commanding Officers, it will be impossible to avoid incidents in British waters where American interests are so prevalent, which will force us to humiliating concessions, unless we are able to prosecute the submarine campaign in its acutest form.
(Signed) SCHEER.
To His Majesty, the Emperor and King.
[Admiralty Note: The German original of this report was found in an officer’s cabin of one of the ships scuttled at Scapa.]